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JUDGES BEHAVING BADLY... CLINICS FIGHTING BACK:
THE STRUGGLE FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILES IN
STATE DEPENDENCY COURTS IN THE AGE OF TRUMP
Bernard P. Perlmutter*
When people talk about refugees, the words used are "they",
"us" or "them". The moment of realization that we are a part
of them, and they are a part of us, is the moment when we can
begin to affect change.
- Ai Weiwei, Law of the Journey1
I. INTRODUCTION: A JOURNEY TO THE COURTHOUSE
In the first half of 2016, nearly 26,000 unaccompanied children-
most of them from Central America-were apprehended at the U.S.
border. 2 The majority of these children came from the "Northern
Triangle"-El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras scaping gang
violence, high murder rates, endemic poverty, and family break-up.3
After making treacherous journeys through Mexico to the U.S., many
* Clinical Professor of Law and Co-Director of the University of Miami School of Law
Children & Youth Law Clinic. Contact information: bperlmutter@law.miami.edu. An earlier
version of this article was presented at the Clinical Law Review Writers' Workshop held at
NYU School of Law in 2017. I thank Muneer Ahmad, Anthony Alfieri, Christine Cimini,
Pamela Chamberlin, Debbie Gonzalez, Robert Latham, Peter Margulies, Michael Scher, and
Sarah Sherman Stokes for comments on earlier drafts. I thank law students Carla Menda,
Katie Duke and Triet Leminh for their research assistance. Special thanks to Mary Ann Krisa
and the Albany Law Review student editors for their careful attention to detail, which made
this a better article. I dedicate this article to the great advocates who represent these children,
and to Arnold Perlmutter, 1928-2017, a child of immigrants ("Il viaggio finisce qui . , .").
1 Ai WEIWEI, LAW OF THE JOURNEY: JiRI FAJT IN CONVERSATION WITH Ai WEIWEI (Mar.
2017). See also Jessica Stewart, Ai Weiwei Draws Attention to the Refugee Crisis with Powerful
New Installation, MY MODERN MET (Mar. 20, 2017), https://mymodernmet.com/ai-weiwei-law-
of-the-journey/ (depicting images from this multi-media art installation on the global refugee
crisis).
2 See United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject and Unaccompanied Alien
Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016: Statement by Secretary Johnson on Southwest
Border Security, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Oct. 18, 2016), www.cbp.gov/newsroom
/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016.
See Rocio Cara Labrador & Danielle Renwick, Central America's Violent Northern
Triangle, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (June 26, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder
/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle.
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of these unaccompanied minors presented themselves to state court
judges in Florida and other states, seeking protection from neglect
and harm and the opportunity to legalize their immigration status.4
One of the ways that these children sought to legalize their status
was through adjudications of dependency and "best interest orders"
issued by state dependency court judges.5 A best interest order is a
prerequisite for an immigrant child to qualify for immigration relief
as a Special Immigrant Juvenile.6 Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status ("SIJS") is a federal visa status available for certain
immigrant children whom the court declares dependent, i.e., unable
to reunify with one or both of their parents "due to abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or a similar basis under State law."7 The juvenile
court must also find that it would not be in the child's best interests
to return to his or the parent's previous country of nationality or
residence.8
Once the court makes the required findings, the child is then
eligible to apply to the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") for
SIJS and lawful permanent residence.9 This two-step process, which
involves both state courts and the federal DHS, is a classic
illustration of immigration federalism.10 What makes it unique is the
centrality of the state court in this hybrid federal-state immigration
decision-making system. The powers of the state courts vis-a-vis the
federal government have waxed and waned over the twenty-eight
years since the original passage of the law in 1990.11
4 See Paula Trujillo Gonzalez, A Precarious Journey: Unaccompanied Minor Migrants of
Central America, HuMANIUM (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.humanium.org/en
/unaccompaniedminorscentral-americal. Between 2013 and 2015, 8,353 potential Special
Immigrant Juvenile-eligible children were released to sponsors in Florida. See Unaccompanied
Alien Children Released to Sponsors by State, OFF. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/unaccompanied-alien-children-released-to-sponsors-by-
state. In 2014, approximately 5,000 unaccompanied alien children arrived in Florida, and
about one-third of them were placed with adult family and non-family sponsors in Miami-Dade
County. Unaccompanied Children Released to Sponsors by County FY14, OFF. REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/unaccompanied-children-
released-to-spons ors-by-county-fyl4.
5 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(ii) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii); Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a 'Best Interests of the
Child'Approach Into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120, 136
(2009).
7 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i), (iii).
8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii). Federal regulations define juvenile court as "a court
located in the United States having jurisdiction under State law to make judicial
determinations about the custody and care of juveniles." 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2009).
9 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii).
10 See Elizabeth Keyes, Evolving Contours of Immigration Federalism: The Case of Migrant
Children, 19 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 37 (2016).
11 See id. at 40 (charting the changing power balances between the state courts and the
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Advocates in Florida for immigrant children seeking dependency
adjudications and best interest orders encountered resistance from
state court judges in the years following the Central American
influx.12 In this Article I parse the body of judicial interpretations of
state dependency and federal SIJS law rejecting state court petitions
filed by immigrant children, primarily in Florida. I trace
undercurrents of anti-immigrant sentiment seeping into recent trial
court rulings and appellate opinions.
Some of the judicial skepticism was motivated by a perception or
fear that the flow of migrant children from Central America was
showing no signs of letting up. 13 Perhaps for these reasons, judges
felt obligated to raise the bar to claims of dependency by these
children. They constructed different narratives to undergird their
rulings. The narratives depicted hordes of alien children coming from
Central America, entering their courtrooms, and alleging "fictional
cases" of dependency which did not request anything from the court
other than a best interest order as a pretext for obtaining
immigration relief.14 The implication was that they were going
through the "back door" of dependency court to qualify for green cards
from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS").15
I frame this case or field study of shifting judicial attitudes toward
immigrant children in Florida, written largely in the first-person, as
a lawyer who has devoted nearly three decades of my career
providing advocacy for these clients, first as a legal services staff
attorney, and for the last twenty-three years as a law school clinician.
When I established the Children & Youth Law Clinic in 1996, our
focus was on advocating for the legal needs of older children in the
state foster care system. From the beginning, we also identified the
federal government in the SIJS cooperative system from 1990 to 2008).
12 See Ashley Cleek, Florida Judges Are Turning Their Backs on Abused Young Immigrants,
NATION (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/florida-judges-are-turning-their-
backs-on-abused-young-immigrants/.
13 See id.
14 See, e.g., Order Requiring Briefing & Scheduling Oral Argument at 5, In re M.A.S.-Q. &
Y.E.S.-Q., No. 09-15392 (11th Cir. Sept. 19, 2013) ("[]t appears that there is no purpose served
by this proceeding and that the Court is nothing more than a paper tiger 'presiding' over a
fictional 'case.' The Court questions whether these Children are-or ever were-'dependent'
on the State, as they are not seeking any services and do not appear to require any protection
from this Court. So it seems that the only objective of this Petition was to obtain the Court's
'assistance' in immigration matters.").
11 See In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187, 1194-95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Wells, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) ("[T]hus what T.J. is seeking here is to be declared dependent to secure
a 'back door' route to naturalization. While I do not believe that Chapter 39 was ever intended
to secure a pathway to citizenship for foreign minors, I must agree that the manner in which
that Chapter currently is written may be interpreted to provide an avenue for such use.").
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needs of unaccompanied immigrant children in our community as a
secondary priority. Clinic faculty and students developed expertise
in the intersecting bodies of state and federal law involved in these
cases.
Our clinic's first client, nicknamed "Tyson," was a homeless,
undocumented Haitian-born teenager, abandoned by his parents,
living on the streets of Miami, playing in a midnight basketball
league where he was mentored by a tax lawyer, who did not have any
background in Florida dependency law or federal immigration law
and did not know how to assist him. We represented this first client
on a private petition for dependency, filed in the Miami-Dade Circuit
Court, asking the court to adjudicate him dependent based on
allegations and evidence that he had been abandoned and neglected
by his parents. Following several hearings in front of the dependency
judge assigned to hear his case, Tyson was declared dependent and
placed in the foster care system, where he thrived.
After his adjudication of dependency, the judge signed a best
interest order, and we assisted Tyson in petitioning the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (precursor to USCIS) for approval of his
SIJS and lawful permanent residence applications. Today Tyson is a
U.S. citizen and tech entrepreneur with two sons, and he has
established a small foundation to assist young immigrants like him. 16
Over the years, our clinic has represented dozens of clients like
Tyson in dependency and foster care, delinquency, family custody
and probate court, as well as in the immigration visa phase of the
SIJS and permanent residence process.17 For almost all of these
clients, their journeys to the courthouse and their experiences in the
courtroom before receptive judges have been transformative, even
life-changing. Representing these clients has also fueled our efforts
to share our expertise and experiences with others wanting to assist
immigrant children.
I evaluate changing state judicial trends in SIJS cases and explore
broader themes about state courts in a time of polarized attitudes
towards immigrants. I discuss in equal measure the evolving legal
doctrine and the fears of an onslaught that shaped the doctrine, even
though the available data suggest that the fears were exaggerated. I
16 See Children and Youth Law Clinic Turns Twenty, U. MIAMI SCH. L. (Nov. 29, 2016),
https://www.law.miami.edu/news/2016/november/children-and-youth-law-clinic-turns-twenty.
17 See Children and Youth Law Clinic, U. MIAMI SCH. L., https://www.law.miami.edu
/academics/clinics/children-and-youth-law-clinic (last visited May 11, 2019); see, e.g., Lissette
Corsa, Orphans of the State, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Mar. 30, 2000), https://www.miaminewtimes
.com/news/orphans-of-the-state-6356793.
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also examine how our clinic and others challenged these legal trends
and tried to refute the underlying messages. I write this Article from
the perspective of a law school clinician, fighting in the trenches to
help these clients. Law school clinics are on the front line before
these courts, together with other advocates, and I discuss some of the
arguments and strategies that we deployed to challenge judges. I
look at the role of clinical legal education, through the training of law
students, providing direct legal representation of these powerless and
often unpopular clients, and trying to effectuate broader systems
reforms. I give some examples of how we advocated not just in courts
but other arenas (legislative and administrative) where state and
federal policies affecting immigrant children seeking SIJS are
developed.
In Part II, I analyze a recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court,
B.R.C.M. v. Florida Department of Children & Families,'8 halting
this trend, and the different views expressed by the plurality,
concurring, and dissenting justices about the standards for
adjudicating an immigrant child dependent under Florida law,
notwithstanding the child's intent to seek a best interest order for
SIJS eligibility under federal law. I discuss the importance and
impact of this largely favorable decision, and speculate about
whether the plurality opinion issued by the court is likely to endure
in the current climate.
In Part III, I analyze historical antecedents to the recent trends
rejecting dependency claims by immigrant children in Florida, and
some of the responses by law school clinics and child and immigrant
advocates. I focus on one egregious case of judicial hostility that
posed a threat to undocumented children and families who appeared
in his courtroom in Palm Beach County fourteen years ago. I describe
some of the judge's actions of sharing confidential court records about
undocumented immigrants with U.S. Border Patrol from the bench
and the anti-immigrant views that he aired to the public. I write
about different strategies we used, and some not used, to put a halt
to the xenophobia that he displayed on and off the bench.
In Part IV, I delve a little further into some of the sources of the
recent backlash against immigrant children by the state judiciary in
Florida and elsewhere. In Part V, I profile the rulings of another
juvenile court judge, in Miami-Dade County, who was a catalyst and
theorist for rulings by other dependency judges and adverse appellate
court decisions that the Florida Supreme Court in B.R.C.M. Ihalted.
18 B.R.C.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (B.R.C.M. 11), 215 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2017).
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In Part VI, I show how the Miami judge's rulings influenced other
judges before B.R.C.M. II and give a few examples of continuing
problems in our state, even after this decision.
In Part VII, I describe different ways our clinic participated in the
efforts to fight judges whose perceptions of immigrants and national
immigration policy views may have influenced their rulings. 19 I
evaluate how the modest B.R.C.M. II plurality opinion, achieved
through legal argument and client storytelling, helped to ensure a
modicum of procedural due process for one undocumented immigrant
child, and I conjecture about its prospects to keep the courthouse door
open for other immigrant children. I give a descriptive account of the
different strategies we used and use this account as a guide for future
strategy to sustain and enforce the B.R. C.M. H decision.
Finally, I evaluate recent polarization in the state judiciary over
immigrant children in light of the immigrant-baiting, wall-building
rhetoric that brought Donald Trump to the presidency, from his
descent down the escalator in his gilded Tower, and now from the
White House, as he separates children from parents at the border,
holds over 14,000 immigrant children in tents and cages, and
demands a wall at the southern border.20 Throughout the Article, I
urge law school clinicians to deepen their understanding of their roles
as educators and advocates for these children when confronted by
similar views and rulings from state court judges, who build walls to
keep them out of their courtrooms, extending a long and regrettable
tradition of racial exclusion and inequality in our nation's treatment
of immigrants.21
19 See, e.g., In re B.R.C.M. (B.R.C.M. 1), 182 So. 3d 749, 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Salter,
J., dissenting) ('That B.R.C.M.'s petition floats on an undercurrent of polarized views regarding
national immigration policy is also without question.").
20 See Robert Costa et al., Trump Sticks to Demand for Border Wall Funding as Shutdown
Drags On, WASH. POST (Jan. 6,. 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/president-
trump-heads-to-camp-david-as-shutdown-enters-third-week/2019/01/06/22af03c0- 1 1c3- 1 1e9-
b6ad-9cfd62dbbOa8 story.html?utmterm=.08106fd63beO; Jennifer Rubin, Trump Is Back to
Racist Rhetoric, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn
/wp/20 18/04/05/trump-is-back-to-racist-rhetoric/?utm-term=.49b4eb4cd72b; Kate Sullivan,
Record 14,000 Unaccompanied Immigrant Children in US Custody, HHS Confirms, CNN (Nov.
23, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/23/politics/hhs-record-14000-immigrant-children-us-
custo dy/index.html?no-st=1553692429; Trump Migrant Separation Policy: Children 'in Cages'
in Texas, BBC NEWS (June 18, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44518942.
21 See generally David B. Oppenheimer et al., Playing the Trump Card: The Enduring Legacy
of Racism in Immigration Law, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 2, 39 (2016) (underscoring the
interplay of longstanding racial animus and immigration policy).
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II. JOURNEYS HALTED AT THE COURTHOUSE DOOR
[S]tatutory dependency in Florida cannot and should not be
allowed to be transformed into an immigration processing
system which is strictly reserved for our federal immigration
authorities.
-Florida Supreme Court Justice Fred LewiS 2 2
The recent Florida juvenile court trend of denying private petitions
relied on interpretations of Florida statutory law, calculated to
exclude immigrant children from the protections of state dependency
law. 2 3 Immigrant children's journeys to stability and safety were
time and time again stopped at the state courthouse door. 24 The
children and their advocates, many from law school clinics,
encountered different forms of judicial resistance, in addition to the
exclusionary jurisprudence, that made their petitions for relief from
abuse and neglect impossible to be heard or granted. 25 Immigrant
children stopped getting what other children in Florida routinely
received from dependency judges, i.e., "an investigation and
individualized adjudication of their exigent circumstances." 26 This
judicial resistance in turn denied them the ability to seek
immigration relief as SIJS petitioners. In effect, by preventing
children from obtaining best interest orders, as the first
"gatekeepers" in the two-tiered SIJS process, the dependency judges
were operating as de facto immigration courts. 27
A. B.R.C.M. I and II
One such child was B.R.C.M., who presented himself to a Florida
state dependency court on a private petition for dependency, filed
through his pro bono counsel at the Florida International University
22 B.R.C.M II, 215 So. 3d at 1224 (Lewis, J., concurring in result).
23 See, e.g., id.
24 See, e.g., B.R. C.M. I, 182 So. 3d at 750 (citing In re F.J.G.M., 40 Fla. L. Weekly 1908, 1908
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); D.A.O.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 170 So. 3d 927, 927 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2015); In re J.A.T.E., 170 So. 3d 931, 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); M.J.M.L. v.
Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 170 So. 3d 931, 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); In re B.Y.G.M.,
176 So. 3d 290, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); In re K.B.L.V., 176 So. 3d 297, 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2015)).
25 See, e.g., B.R.C.M I, 182 So. 3d at 749, 763-64 (Salter, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 766.
27 See generally Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 555, 580
(2013) (describing how local prosecutors in their capacity as "gatekeepers" for lawfully present
noncitizens charged with crimes displaced federal removal priorities exercised by the Executive
branch, pre-Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)).
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College of Law's Immigrant Children's Justice Clinic ("FIU clinic"),
which also was B.R.C.M.'s "next friend."28  According to the
dependency petition, he was born in Guatemala in 1999.29 His
"father abandoned him [after] birth and never provided him with
[any] food, shelter, clothing, [or] medical care." 30 When B.R.C.M. was
age four, his mother abandoned him and stopped providing him with
these basic necessities. 31 He was taken in by his elderly grandmother
who cared for him until age thirteen, when he was forced to leave her
home because she was too ill to care for him. 3 2 Having no family to
take care of him and fearing that local gangs would try to recruit him,
B.R.C.M. fled his home and came to the U.S. through Mexico. 33 Upon
arrival at the border in Hidalgo, Texas, he turned himself in to
authorities and was remanded to the custody of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement ("ORR"), which placed him in the home of his
immigration sponsor, a godmother who lived in Miami. 34 The
sponsorship agreement that the godmother entered into with the
ORR advised her to petition a state court to establish "legal
guardianship" over her ward. 35 A short time after he made it to the
28 See B.R.C.M I, 182 So. 3d at 749, 751. The FIU clinic served the dual role of counsel and
next friend because under Florida law (as in every jurisdiction), a child may not initiate or
defend a court action except through a guardian or next friend. See FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.210(b)
(2019); see also Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 783-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958); Zaro v. Strauss, 167 F.2d 218,
220 (5th Cir. 1948); Brown v. Ripley, 119 So. 2d 712, 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); then citing
Brown v. Caldwell, 389 So. 2d 287, 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); and then citing Youngblood
v. Taylor, 89 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 1956)) (discussing Rule 1.210(b)).
Florida law allows an attorney for the Department of Children and Families ("DCF"') or "any
other person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or is informed of them and believes that
they are true," to initiate a proceeding seeking an adjudication that a child is dependent. See
FLA. STAT. § 39.501(1) (2019).
As counsel for the child, and as B.R.C.M.'s fiduciary, the FIU clinic was under a special
obligation to conduct in-depth interviews with the child and significant people in the child's
life, fully investigate all of the facts, integrate the facts into a coherent form, understand the
"child-in-context," and demonstrate utmost fidelity to the child's unique perspective in making
allegations of abuse, abandonment or neglect in the dependency petition. See generally JEAN
KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND
PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 147-80 (3rd ed. 2007).
29 See B.R.C.M. 1, 182 So. 3d at 756 (Slater, J., dissenting).
30 B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 2017).
3 Id.
32 Id.
3s Id.
34 Id. As the child's sponsor, the godmother was "entrusted with his care and custody by the
federal government," but she did not have the plenary authority that a parent or guardian
exercises for a child. See id. at 1221 n.1.
35 Id. at 1221 n.I. In reviewing the sponsor care agreement, the Florida Supreme Court
plurality observed: "[t]he sponsor care agreement encourages sponsors who are neither parents
nor legal guardians to establish legal guardianship with the local court. . . . An adjudication of
dependency would not preclude B.R.C.M. from continued care by his godmother, but would
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U.S., following his placement in ORR care, he met his father for the
first time and had some telephone contact with him while in the
godmother's care, but the father continued not to provide any support
for his basic needs. 36 B.R.C.M.'s godmother did not seek a child
support order from the father, but after settling in with the
godmother, fifteen year-old B.R.C.M., through his FIU clinic lawyers,
petitioned a Florida state juvenile court judge for an adjudication of
dependency. 37
B.R.C.M. alleged three legal grounds for adjudication of
dependency under section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes. 38 The petition
asserted that B.R.C.M. was dependent pursuant to section
39.01(15)(a), which defines a "dependent child" as one found by the
court "to have been abandoned, abused or neglected by the child's
parent or parents or legal custodians." 39 Second, he said that he was
dependent under section 39.01(15)(e), which defines dependent child
as one who has "no parent or legal custodians capable of providing
supervision and care."4 0 His third ground alleged dependency under
section 39.01(15)(f), defining a dependent child as one who is at
"substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect,"
which in this case referred to the risks that B.R.C.M. faced if he
returned to Guatemala.41 B.R.C.M. also sought a separate "best
interests order" from the court, as a predicate for SIJ status, with
findings that reunification with one or both of his parents was not
possible and that it was not in his best interests to be returned to
Guatemala. 42 At the conclusion of an eight-minute hearing in a
Miami dependency court, at which no questions were asked of the
child, no evidence was presented, and his counsel was only granted a
brief chance to summarize the allegations in the child's petition, the
court denied the petition.43
The order was affirmed by the Florida Third District Court of
Appeal in an opinion written by Judge Frank Shepherd. 44 The
appellate court majority held that B.R.C.M. was not "truly" abused,
ensure appropriate placement for the child, consistent with the permanency goals of Chapter
39 of the Florida Statutes." Id.
36 Id. at 1221.
3 B.R.C.M. I, 182 So. 3d 749, 751 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); id. at 756 (Salter, J.,
dissenting).
8 B.R.C.M II, 215 So. 3d at 1221.
39 Id.
40 I[d.
41 See id.
42 See B.R.C.M I, 182 So. 3d at 756, 578 (Salter, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 755.
44 Id. at 751, 754 (majority opinion).
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abandoned or neglected under Florida law, that his godmother qua
sponsor was providing for all of his needs, and his sole reason or
"agenda" for filing his petition for dependency was to facilitate an
application for SIJS, as evidenced by his failure to seek services from
DCF. 4 5 The majority repeatedly ascribed to B.R.C.M. what it
categorized as an illicit intent to seek SIJS and not protection from
abuse, abandonment or neglect.46 This intent, according to the court,
categorically disqualified him from being declared dependent under
Florida statutory law.4 7 Although the court conceded that "[a]
godmother is neither a parent nor legal custodian under the
[dependency] statute," it determined that it was "plain on the face of
the petition that B.R.C.M. is not 'truly' abandoned, abused or
neglected within the meaning of Chapter 39."48 It concluded, "The
purpose of the dependency laws of this state is to protect and serve
children and families in need, not those with a different agenda." 49
This holding spurred a thirteen-page dissent by Judge Vance
Salter, grounded in a deep understanding of the applicable federal
and state laws at issue.50 The dissenting judge's interpretation of
Florida dependency law was significant for its careful, scholarly, and
critical analysis of the trend toward summary denials of dependency
petitions by immigrant juveniles based on a belief or conclusion that
the juveniles are not entitled to adjudicative findings because they
are only seeking immigration relief, not state assistance following
abuse, abandonment or neglect.5 1 Judge Salter concluded that the
facts alleged in B.R.C.M.'s petition stated a prima facie case of
dependency, 52 and that absent an investigation by DCF of B.R.C.M.'s
allegations, the trial court had no basis to summarily deny the child's
petition.53 Judge Salter urged a reversal of the trial court ruling,
stating that "Florida circuit courts should enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law that address each juvenile petitioner's individual
45 See id. at 751-52, 754 (citing In re K.B.L.V., 176 So. 3d 297, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 2015)
(Shepherd, J., specially concurring)).
46 See B.R.C.M. 1, 182 So. 3d at 751-52.
47 See id. at 754 (citing In re KB.L. V., 176 So. 3d at 301 (Shepherd, J., specially concurring)).
48 B.R.C.M I, 182 So. 3d at 751-52, 754.
49 Id. at 754 (citing In re KB.L. V, 176 So. 3d at 301 (Shepherd, J., specially concurring)).
5 See B.R.C.M I, 182 So. 3d at 754-67 (Salter, J., dissenting).
51 See id. at 766.
52 See id.
5 See id. at 755. "In my view, DCF cannot assess whether a petitioning juvenile immigrant
has been 'truly' abandoned, abused, or neglected without investigation, and should not decline
to support or oppose the claims in a sworn SIJ petition, as occurred in B.R.C.M.'s case." Id. at
755 n.6.
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claims ."54
The divergent views in the majority and dissenting opinions
illustrated a split in the court. On one end of the judicial spectrum
was Judge Shepherd, basing his opinion on sweeping assumptions
about the immigrant children's illicit motivations and "agenda[s]" for
filing dependency petitions.55 On the other side was the Salter
dissent, which saw B.R.C.M. as an individual child or litigant whose
"individual claims" the dependency court had a duty to adjudicate. 56
On petition for review, Judge Salter's view that B.R.C.M.'s petition
"warrant[ed] individualized consideration and adjudication rather
than summary denial," was adopted by a plurality of the Florida
Supreme Court.57 Three justices, plus one concurring justice, found
the summary denial of B.R.C.M.'s petition had deprived him of the
essentials of due process in the hearing.58 The majority held that the
trial court must provide B.R.C.M. with a full evidentiary hearing to
prove allegations of abuse, neglect or abandonment, and make
written findings of fact specific to the case presented to the juvenile
court in determining whether the child was dependent based on one
or more of the statutory grounds for dependency. 59 All seven justices
rejected the lower court view that the claims must be denied merely
because the child was able to apply for immigration benefits and did
not seek state services after an adjudication of dependency under
state law. 60
In accepting jurisdiction over the appeal on conflict grounds, the
court held that B.R.C.M. I "expressly and directly conflict[ed]" 6 1 with
the First District Court of Appeal decision in In re Y V.62 On the
merits, as indicated, the court unanimously rejected the false
dichotomy posited by Judge Shepherd in B.R.C.M. I, i.e., that an
intent to seek dependency status trumps the trial court's duty to
adjudicate an immigrant child dependent based on one of the seven
54 Id. at 766.
55 See id. at 754 (majority opinion) (quoting In re K.B.L.V., 176 So. 3d 297, 301 (2015)
(Shepherd, J., specially concurring)).
56 See B.R.C.M. I, 182 So. 3d at 766 (Salter, J., dissenting).
5 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d 1219, 1223-24 (Fla. 2017) (quoting B.R.C.M. I, 182 So. 3d at
754-55 (Salter, J., dissenting)).
58 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1223, 1224 (Lewis, J., concurring in result).
59 See id. at 1223 (citing B.R.C.M I, 182 So. 3d at 755, 766 (Salter, J., dissenting)).
6 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1223, 1225 (Canady, J., dissenting).
61 See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
62 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1222; see also In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2015) ("An intent to obtain SIJ status says nothing in and of itself regarding the facial
sufficiency of the dependency allegations .... Therefore, a petition for dependency should not
be rejected in Florida based on mere motivation of the petitioner.").
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independent grounds enumerated in section 39.01(15).63 The
plurality agreed that B.R.C.M.'s petition sought relief consistent with
the purposes of Chapter 39, i.e., "[t]o provide for the care, safety, and
protection of children . .. ; to ensure secure and safe custody; to
promote the health and well-being of all children under the state's
care; and to prevent the occurrence of child abuse, neglect, and
abandonment." 6 4
The plurality thus embraced Judge Salter's criticism of the "recent
spate of summary denial orders in the trial court and the per curiam
affirmances in [the Third District]," suggesting "a categorical
rejection of such petitions rather than the usual individualized
evidentiary hearings and written findings of fact." 65 The court held,
"[w]e disapprove of the categorical summary denial of dependency
petitions filed by immigrant juveniles, and find no authority in the
statutory scheme that allows for dismissal or denial without factual
findings by the circuit court." 6 6 It quashed the decision of the district
court.67
The plurality opinion, authored by Chief Justice Jorge Labarga,
spurred three concurrences, two with opinions. The concurrences
articulated concerns about the potential impact of the court's decision
on dependency courts. 68 Both saw the potential for the decision to
spur more dependency filings and overwhelm the courts, but they
gave slightly different reasons for this concern.69 Justice Fred Lewis
agreed with the plurality's conclusion that the summary nature of
the trial court proceeding in B.R.C.M.'s case was improper, but he
also expressed sympathy for the sentiments of "multiple district
63 See B.R.C.M II, 215 So. 3d at 1222 (quoting O.I.C.L. v. Fla. Dep't. of Children & Families
(O.I.C.L. I), 205 So. 3d 575, 578 (Fla. 2016)). "[1]f a child qualifies for a declaration of
dependency under our statutes, the child's motivation to obtain legal residency ... is
irrelevant." B.R.C.M II, 215 So. 3d at 1222 (quoting F.L.M. v. Fla. Dep't. of Children and
Families, 912 So. 2d 1264, 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)). "[I]f federal law grants a right to
alien children to regularize their immigration status by first obtaining a state court
adjudication of dependency, then there is no basis for failing to declare a child dependent so
long as he or she meets the statutory criteria for dependency." B.R.C.M II, 215 So. 3d at 1222
(quoting EL.M., 912 So. 2d at 1269).
64 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1222 (emphasis added).
65 Id. at 1223 (quoting B.R.C.M I, 182 So. 3d at 764 (Salter, J., dissenting)).
6 B.R.C.M II, 215 So. 3d at 1223.
67 See id.
68 See id. at 1224 (Lawson, J., specially concurring); id. (Lewis, J., concurring in result).
69 Compare id. at 1224 (Lawson, J., specially concurring) ("[P]rivate dependency petitions
cannot simply be summarily and categorically denied because they appear to be motivated by
a desire to gain immigration relief for the child."), with id. at 1224 (Lewis, J., concurring in
result) ("[TJhe structure of statutory dependency in Florida cannot and should not be allowed
to be transformed into an immigration processing system which is strictly reserved for our
federal immigration authorities.").
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courts in Florida, including the Third District which have essentially
held that the structure of statutory dependency in Florida cannot and
should not be allowed to be transformed into an immigration
processing system."7 0 He exhorted the legislature to pay more
attention to these concerns and find a way to narrow the grounds for
dependency, thus potentially closing the door, at least partly, on
future dependency petitions filed by immigrant children.71 He
incorrectly characterized the SIJS law as one "strictly reserved for
our federal immigration authorities," 72 overlooking the hybrid
federal-state character of the SIJS statute.73
The special concurrence by Justice Charles Alan Lawson agreed
with the plurality that "private dependency petitions cannot simply
be summarily and categorically denied because they appear to be
motivated by a desire to gain immigration relief for the child."74 He
also agreed with Justice Lewis that the legislature needed to clarify
Florida statutory law in this area, warning that the "valuable
resources" of the state's judiciary would be taxed by "trying to figure
out whether and how to apply our dependency statute to facts that do
not appear to have even been contemplated when it was enacted." 75
He did not give any examples of how the facts alleged in B.R.C.M.'s
case or any other immigrant children's reported cases had strayed
outside of the legislature's intent in enacting Chapter 39. Nor did he
suggest any language to amend the statute in order to limit
immigrant children's overuse of the dependency courts, which he
70 Id. at 1224 (Lewis, J., concurring in result). Because Justice Lewis agreed on narrow
grounds with the plurality (Chief Justice Labarga, and Justices Pariente and Lawson), in this
article I refer to the opinion as the "plurality opinion." Given the tight 3-1-3 breakdown, this
seemed to make sense, to emphasize the slender agreement between the justices, which came
with varying degrees of disagreement. The dissent referred to it as the "majority opinion."
My clinic colleague Robert Latham called it the "controlling opinion" in his blog post
analyzing the decision in April 2017. See Robert Latham, Florida Supreme Court: No More
Summary Dismissals of Private Dependency Petitions Filed by Immigrant Kids,
ROBERTLATHAMESQ.ORG (Apr. 20, 2017), https://robertlathamesq.org/florida-supreme-court-no-
more-summary-dismissals-of-private-dependency-petitions-filed-by-immigrant-kids; see
generally Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value
of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 451 (1992) (discussing alternatives to
"narrowest grounds" doctrine adopted by Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)). The
"narrowest grounds doctrine states, "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of the five Justices, 'the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds." Thurmon, supra, at 420.
71 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1224 (Lewis, J., concurring in result).
72 See id.
7 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2018).
7 B.C.R.M II, 215 So. 3d at 1224 (Lawson, J., specially concurring).
75 Id.
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implied was wasting the state judiciary's limited resources.76 The
fact that both of these concurrences voiced these concerns exemplifies
the narrow scope of agreement in the plurality opinion.
Justice Charles Canady's dissent, joined by Justices Peggy Quince
and Ricky Polston, agreed with the other justices that "if a child
meets the statutory criteria for dependency, the child must be
adjudicated accordingly, regardless of immigration motivations."77
They also all agreed that if the child alleges a prima facie case of
dependency, the child should be permitted the opportunity to present
evidence in support of the petition.78 This point of agreement was
noteworthy for finding some common ground with concurring Justice
Lewis, whose sole reason for joining the plurality in the result was
that summary dismissal of a dependent petition that establishes a
prima facie case of dependency violates the child's due process
rights.79
But the dissenters parted company with Justice Lewis and the
plurality at this point, concluding that B.R.C.M.'s petition did not
satisfy the minimum prima facie standards for a declaration of
dependency under sections 39.01(15)(a), (e), and (f). 80 In doing so
they opined that B.R.C.M. had failed to allege facts that "pass[ed] the
threshold requirement for an evidentiary hearing" under these three
sections.81  Much of the dissent's analysis was based on a
parsimonious reading of the facts alleged in the petition in order to
reach this conclusion about their legal sufficiency. 82 As to the section
39.01(15)(e) allegation, the dissent stated that B.R.C.M.'s petition
was "devoid of any claim" that he could be adjudicated dependent as
a child found "[t]o have no parent or legal custodians capable of
providing supervision and care."8 3 This short, conclusory point was
itself devoid of any analysis of the actual words in the petition to
reach the conclusion that it had failed to allege that he had no parent
or legal custodian capable of providing supervision and care. This
circular argument gave the dissent a pretext to suggest that an
evidentiary hearing on an "unpleaded claim [was] totally
unjustified."84 This was obliquely disputed by the plurality's more
76 See id.
77 Id. at 1225 (Canady, J., dissenting).
1 See id.
7 See id. at 1224 (Lewis, J., concurring in result).
8 See id. at 1225 (Canady, J., dissenting).
81 See id.
82 See id. at 1225-26.
83 Id. at 1225.
4 See id.
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generous reading of the child's petition, which it viewed as alleging
"sufficient facts" to establish a prima facie case on all three grounds.85
The B.R. C.M. II dissent also implicitly took issue with the B.R. C.M.
I dissent, which observed that these facts were alleged, and in the
absence of an investigation by DCF into the allegations, a court could
not find that the child had no parent or legal custodian capable of
providing supervision and care.86
The dissent's view of the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in
support of sections 39.01(a) and (f), was similarly punctilious in
finding them faulty. Running the allegations in the petition through
the "definitional maze of section 39.01," it cherry-picked facts to
conclude that B.R.C.M. did not state a prima facie case of
abandonment or neglect under section 39.01(15) (a).8 7 Regarding the
abandonment allegations, it called the child's abandonment in
Guatemala too "temporally remote" to qualify as abandonment under
section 39.01(15). 8 The dissent read the present-tense definition of
"[c]hild who is found to be dependent" to be a categorical reason to
dismiss allegations of abandonment happening long ago, in a land far
away from Florida.89
The dissent's next abandonment point read section 39.01(15)(a) in
pari materia with section 39.01(1), requiring abandonment to allege
that the parent, "while being able, has made no significant
contribution to the child's care and maintenance."90 It pointed to
pleading defects, viz., that the petition failed to allege that the
parents "were able to do anything to remedy their failures regarding
the care of B.R.C.M."91 The plurality skirted this point in general
terms, again giving the petition the benefit of the doubt for stating
"sufficient facts" as a prima facie case on all three statutory
grounds. 92
In evaluating the legal sufficiency of both the abandonment and
neglect allegations, the dissent split hairs, cobbling together different
sections of Chapter 39 to find no legal grounds to declare B.R.C.M.
dependent because he was being properly cared for by his godmother,
85 See id. at 1223 (plurality opinion).
86 See id. at 1124-25 (Canady, J., dissenting); B.R.C.M 1, 182 So. 3d 749, 754-55, 756 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Salter, J., dissenting).
87 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1225.
m See id.
89 See id. (emphasis added).
90 See id. (emphasis added).
91 See id. at 1226.
92 See id. at 1223 (plurality opinion).
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the ORR-designated sponsor qua caregiver. 93 Since the godmother
qualified as a "caregiver,"94 was "legally responsible for the child's
welfare" as defined by section 39.01(47), and had been entrusted by
the federal government to provide care for him, and since B.R.C.M.
wanted to "remain in the custody of the caregiver," 95 how could she
be deemed to have abandoned or neglected him? 96 It was at this point
that the dissent's interpretation of the legal significance of a sponsor
agreement with ORR went a little off the rails.
Justice Canady failed to appreciate that a sponsor agreement with
ORR carries far less legal significance than a state court order
conferring legal custody status. 97 The two are not the same, as
pointed out by the plurality in a footnote. 98 Justice Canady leapt to
the conclusion that the placement of B.R.C.M. with the
godmother/sponsor transformed her into the child's "caregiver" under
section 39.01(10), and seeing B.R.C.M. as being "in the custody of the
government of the United States, which has ultimate responsibility
for his well-being, thereby ignoring the fact that it is the state court's
ultimate responsibility for making individualized determinations of
care and custody for children like B.R.C.M. 99 Justice Canady ignored
the fact that it is the state court's ultimate responsibility for making
9 See id. at 1225, 1226 (Canady, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 1226.
95 See id.; see also O.I.C.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families (O.I.C.L. 1), 169 So. 3d 1244,
1246-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that 17 year-old Guatemalan child, abandoned by
his father during mother's pregnancy, neglected by mother since age 12, but later detained by
ORR following his entry into the U.S. and apprehension, did not qualify to be declared
dependent under Fla. Stat. § 39.01(15)(a) because ORR released child to an uncle and there
were no allegations of abandonment, abuse or neglect against the child's uncle, and a
presumption arose that he was indeed capable of providing both supervision and care to
O.I.C.L.).
96 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1226.
9 Cf. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(39) (2018) ('"Legal custody' means a legal status created by a court
which vests in a custodian of the person or guardian, whether an agency or an individual, the
right to have physical custody of the child and the right and duty to protect, nurture, guide,
and discipline the child and to provide him or her with food, shelter, education, and ordinary
medical, dental, psychiatric, and psychological care.").
9 See B.R.C.M II, 215 So. 3d at 1221 n.1 (plurality opinion).
We recognize that B.R.C.M. appears to reside with his godmother, who as a sponsor, is
entrusted with his care .... The sponsor care agreement encourages sponsors who are
neither parents nor legal guardians to establish legal guardianship with the local court.
We observe that Florida courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all proceedings relating to
child welfare. An adjudication of dependency would not preclude B.R.C.M. from continued
care by his godmother, but would ensure appropriate placement for the child, consistent
with the permanency goals of Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes.
Id.
9 See id. at 1226 (Canady, J., dissenting).
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individualized determinations of care and custody for children like
B.R.C.M. 00 Justice Canady thus elevated the importance of the
federal government's role over the state court's role in his analysis of
the dueling responsibilities of the court and ORR. This reflected a
lack of appreciation of the state court's co-equal role in the SIJS
cooperative federalism system. 101
The dissent summarized B.R.C.M.'s dependency petition as falling
short of the "specific requirements of the dependency statute," with
the caveat that "not every undocumented child will necessarily meet
the requirements for a determination of dependency."1 0 2 However, a
heightened pleading standard for immigrant children is not required
or permitted by Florida dependency law. 103 Justice Canady, with his
repeated demands for "specificity," departed from the requirements
of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which state that a petition
need only "allege sufficient facts showing the child to be dependent
based upon applicable law." 10 4
B. The Importance and Impact of B.R.C.M. II
The B.R. C.M. II decision halted categorical rejections by judges of
claims of abuse, abandonment or neglect by immigrant children,
which had escalated in Florida trial and appellate courts. 105 It also
100 See id. at 1222 (plurality opinion); id. at 1226 (Canady, J., dissenting).
101 See id. at 1226 (Canady, J., dissenting). The dissent also found the neglect allegation to
be defective inasmuch as it was based on the categorical disqualifying ground of the
Guatemalan family's and father's "financial inability." See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50); B.R. C.M. II,
215 So. 3d at 1226. It also played down the potential for deportation to Guatemala as a basis
to support claim that B.R.C.M. was "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or
neglect by the parent or parents." See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(f); B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1226.
102 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1227.
103 See id. at 1223 (plurality opinion) (citing In re B.R.C.M. I, 182 So. 3d 749, 755 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2015) (Salter, J., dissenting)).
10 FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.310(a)(1) (2016) (emphasis added).
10 One appellate court covering Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties, the Third District Court
of Appeal, affirmed trial court dismissals no fewer than thirteen times, starting with two
affirmances with majority and strongly-worded concurring opinions. See, e.g., In re B.Y.G.M.,
176 So. 3d 290, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); In re K.B.L.V., 176 So. 3d 297, 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2015). They were followed by at least eleven per curiam and other affirmances of trial
court summary denials of dependency petitions. See, e.g., W.B.A.V. v. Dep't of Children &
Families, 229 So. 3d 850, 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (per curiam); W.O.V. v. Dep't of Children
& Families, 193 So. 3d 85, 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (per curiam); In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d
897, 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d 534, 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016);
In re E.P.N., 180 So. 3d 249, 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (per curiam); W.A.Z.R. v. Dep't of
Children & Families, 187 So. 3d 245, 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); H.D.C.H.M. v. Dep't of
Children & Families, 176 So. 3d 392, 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (per curiam); In re D.A.M.,
185 So. 3d 535, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); D.A.O.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 170 So.
3d 927, 927 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); In re J.A.T.E., 170 So. 3d 931, 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015) (per curiam); M.J.M.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 170 So. 3d 931, 932 (Fla. Dist.
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firmly and unanimously rejected a false dichotomy, debunking the
view articulated by Judge Shepherd that would shut the courthouse
door on any dependency petition filed by a child motivated to seek
SIJS.1 06 This consensus on one fundamental question was undercut
by the differing perspectives expressed by a fragmented court. At a
more granular level, the hesitant and elliptical reasoning in the
plurality opinion did not offer detailed guidance to dependency courts
on how to treat allegations in dependency petitions filed by
immigrant children living with ORR-approved sponsors. 107
This equivocation, and the differing points of view expressed in the
concurring and dissenting opinions, may have reflected the justices'
differences in statutory interpretation; disagreements about the role
of the juvenile court in the SIJS statutory scheme; stated or unstated
partisan differences about immigration policy; and their contrasting
Ct. App. 2015) (per curiam).
106 See B.R.C.M II, 215 So. 3d at 1222, 1223 (citing In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 578, 581 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2015)).
107 The Florida Supreme Court declined Judge Salter's B.R.C.M. I request to certify the
following question of "great public importance":
REGARDING PETITIONS FOR DEPENDENCY FILED ON BEHALF OF IMMIGRANT
JUVENILES UNDER CHAPTER 39, FLORIDA STATUTES, IS SUMMARY DENIAL OF
SUCH PETITIONS APPROPRIATE IF THE PETITIONER IS LIVING IN FLORIDA
WITH A FAMILY MEMBER OR VOLUNTEER APPROVED BY THE OFFICE OF
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT?
B.R. C.M. I, 182 So. 3d at 766 (Salter, J., dissenting). Salter referred to the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision in H.S.P. v. J.K., 121 A. 3d 849 (N.J. 2015), as providing clear guidance to the
trial courts on how to make factual findings in family court and SIJS "one parent" cases.
B.R.C.M. I, 182 So. 3d at 765. He saw this as a model of judicial drafting which would inure to
the children's benefit in securing best interest orders from family court judges, and provide
greater clarity to USCIS in fulfilling its obligations to render SIJS decisions, "exclusively the
province of the federal government," predicated on best interest orders issued by the family
courts:
In an effort to ensure that factual findings issued by New Jersey courts provide USCIS
with the necessary information to determine whether a given alien satisfies the eligibility
criteria for SIJ status, we instruct courts of the Family Part to make separate findings as
to abuse, neglect, and abandonment with regard to both legal parents of an alien juvenile.
For example, the Family Part should first determine whether reunification with one of the
child's parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Regardless of the
outcome of that analysis, the court should next conduct the same analysis with regard to
the child's other legal parent. By requiring the Family Part to make independent findings
as to both of the juvenile's parents, we ensure that USCIS will have sufficient information
to apply 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(J)(27) as it sees fit when a juvenile subsequently submits the
Family Part's order to USCIS in support of an application for SIJ status. That is the role
Congress envisioned for the juvenile courts of the fifty states, and that is the process that
should be followed by the Family Part.
Id. (quoting H.S.P., 121 A. 3d at 860).
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views of immigrants at the border and in the community.108
C. The Politics of B.R.C.M. II
The politics of B.R.C.M. II are perhaps most obvious in the
concurring justices' exhortations to the legislature to clarify Florida
dependency law, suggesting that such clarification should restrict
immigrant children's access to the courts in the future.109 Neither
concurring justice offered any concrete suggestions for substantive
amendments to Chapter 39.110 However, given the partisan views of
many members of the Florida Republican-controlled legislature,
which are often not hospitable to immigrants, there is probably little
chance that legislation responding to these suggestions from the
judiciary would benefit immigrant children in dependency court
proceedings.11 ' Political considerations also ran through the
labyrinthine reasoning of the three dissenting justices' opinion,
which engaged in circuitous statutory construction to criticize the
legal sufficiency of B.R.C.M.'s petition.112 The dissent's views about
the nature and level of harm that must be pled in a petition,113 if
adopted by rule or statute, could have an adverse impact on petitions
filed on behalf of citizen children as well as immigrant children,
although that is beyond the scope of this Article. With three new
conservative justices appointed by Republican Governor Ron
DeSantis to replace retiring Justices Lewis, Pariente, and Quince," 4
108 This fragmentation or polarization is to some degree a reflection of hyper-partisanship
over immigrants in our national politics today. See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L. REV. 739, 774 (2018) ("The perception of
judicial impartiality is essential to a belief in judicial legitimacy. In the current era, however,
the public's deepening political divide threatens the perception of judicial neutrality.").
109 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1224 (Lawson, J., concurring); id. (Lewis, J., concurring).
110 Cf. id. at 1224 (Lawson, J., concurring) (recommending the legislature should make
amendments but not describing how); id. (Lewis, J., concurring) (recommending the legislature
should make amendments but not describing how).
111 See, e.g., Gray Rohrer, Immigration Dominates Florida's Race for Governor, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.orlandosentinel.comlnews/politics/political-pulse/os-
sanctuary-cities-governor-race-20 180202-story.html ("State leaders have no authority over
federal immigration policy, but that hasn't stopped the issue from becoming the hottest topic
in the early stages of the Florida governor's race. Republican House Speaker Richard Corcoran
has made it the center of his not-quite-yet-announced campaign by fast-tracking a bill banning
'sanctuary cities' in Florida and releasing an ad Democrats have slammed as 'race-baiting."').
112 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So.3d at 1226 (Canady, J., dissenting).
na See id. at 1225.
114 See Governor Ron DeSantis Appoints Barbara Lagoa to the Florida Supreme Court, FLA.
GOVERNOR (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.flgov.com/2019/01/09/governor-ron-desantis-appoints-b
arbara-lagoa-to-the-florida-supreme-court/; Governor Ron DeSantis Appoints Carlos Muhiz to
the Florida Supreme Court, FLA. GOVERNOR (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.flgov.com/2019/01/22
/governor-ron-desantis-appoints-carlos-muniz-to-the-florida-supreme-court/; Governor Ron
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this modest plurality opinion is probably the last chance to establish
baseline legal protections for immigrant children in Florida's courts.
The recent judicial hostility to private petitions by immigrant
children can be seen as using different statutory interpretations as
proxies for partisan views about undocumented immigrants,
although the judicial opinions did not necessarily divide along
traditional liberal-conservative lines. 15 The Third District Court of
Appeal's view that these children were not "truly" abandoned,
abused, or neglected if they sought immigration benefits but not
services from the state, was a way of saying that they were not
worthy of the courts' attention.1 1 6 This is now a debunked viewpoint
even though the future of the cases is uncertain.117
D. Foreshadows and Echoes in B.R. C.M. II
Earlier rulings by trial courts and opinions by intermediate
appellate courts, and one earlier SIJS-dependency opinion by the
Florida Supreme Court, foreshadowed many of the contrasting points
of view expressed by the court in B.R.C.M II, particularly by the
concurrences and dissent.118  The views also echoed critical
observations made by trial and appeal courts in earlier rulings
suggesting that children were gaming the system to obtain
unwarranted judicial relief on "paper" only. 119  Another
DeSantis Appoints Robert Luck to the Florida Supreme Court, FLA. GOvERNOR (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://www.flgov.com/2019/01/14/governor-ron-desantis-appoints-robert-luck-to-the-florida-
supreme-court/.
115 For example, African-American Florida Supreme Court Justice Peggy Quince during her
many years on the bench typically joined the more liberal wing of the Court in cases involving
children. See, e.g., In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 26 So. 3d 552,
556-57 (Fla. 2009) (prohibiting a generalized practice of shackling children in the courtroom);
The Honorable Peggy A. Quince, FLORIDA'S WOMEN'S HALL OF FAME, https://
flwomenshalloffame.org/bio/honorable-peggy-a-quince/ (last visited May 11, 2019). This time
she was allied in dissent with politically conservative Justices Canady and Polston. See
B.R.C.M., 215 So. 3d at 1224; Charles Canady, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Charles
.Canady (last visited May 11, 2019); Ricky Polston, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Ricky
Polston (last visited May 11, 2019).
116 This was the point of view that prevailed in the Third District Court of Appeal in
numerous opinions and per curiam affirmances before B.R.C.M. I and II. See, e.g., In re
B.Y.G.M., 176 So. 3d 290, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("It is understood that B.Y.G.M. filed
her petition to secure SIJS, and that she did not do so in order to obtain relief from abuse,
abandonment, or neglect.").
117 See B.R. C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1222, 1224 (quoting B.R.C.M I, 182 So. 3d 749, 754 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2015)).
11s See B.R.C.M II, 215 So. 3d at 1224 (Lawson, J., specially concurring); id. at 1224 (Lewis,
J., concurring in result); id. at 1225 (Canady, J., dissenting); e.g., O.I.C.L. II v. Fla. Dep't of
Children & Families, 205 So. 3d 575, 577 (Fla. 2016); In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 581 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2015); In re B. YG.M, 176 So. 3d at 291.
119 See, e.g., Order Requiring Briefing & Scheduling Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 5 ("[I]t
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foreshadowing of skepticism about the legitimacy of private
dependency petitions filed by immigrant children was expressed in a
Third District Court of Appeal partial concurrence in an earlier case,
which chastened these children for going through the dependency
"back door" to qualify for immigration status, while conceding that
this was permissible under Florida dependency law and the SIJS
statute. 120 Many trial court dismissals, and many appellate opinions
affirming dismissals, also anticipated Justice Lawson's B.R.C.M. II
special concurrence, which implicitly criticized the immigrant
children's private dependency petitions as pushing the boundaries of
Chapter 39 "that do not appear to have even been contemplated when
it was enacted."121
One way that courts saw Chapter 39 boundary-pushing can be seen
in their statutory interpretations of cases alleging abandonment
before or at birth or early in a child's life as a basis for affirming the
dismissal.1 22  A Miami-Dade trial court's interpretation of
abandonment allegations in a petition foreshadowed the B.R.C.M. II
dissent's reasoning that abandonment during pregnancy or after the
child's birth was too "temporally remote" to qualify the child for a
declaration of dependency under Florida law.1 23 In classifying the
claims as too remote to qualify for a dependency adjudication, the
dependency court order conflated the statutory requirements for
"abandonment" and "abuse" allegations, and inserted requirements
that recent "harm" be alleged in cases of parental abandonment,
when the abandonment occurred at or before the child's birth and the
parent continued the acts or omissions that qualified as
"abandonment" pursuant to the statute. 124  Notably, the
abandonment statute does not require a showing of harm to qualify
a child as a dependent,1 25 unlike the statutory definition of abuse
which does contain a harm requirement.1 26
appears that there is no purpose served by this proceeding and that the Court is nothing more
than a paper tiger 'presiding' over a fictional 'case.") (emphasis added).
120 See In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187, 1194-95 (Wells, J., dissenting in part).
121 See B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d at 1224 (Lawson, J., concurring).
122 See id. at 1225 (Canady, J., dissenting).
123 See In re M.A.S.-Q. & Y.E.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 213a (11th Cir. Ct. Oct. 22,
2013) (citing B.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 846 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003); R.V. v. Dep't of Children & Servs., 939 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); C.R. v.
Dep't of Children & Families, 45 So. 3d 988, 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam); W.T.
v. Dep't of Children & Families, 787 So. 2d 184, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)) ("[A]bsent a
continuing threat of harm, incidents of alleged abuse found "too remote in time" will generally
not support a dependency adjudication."); infra Part V, VI.
124 See In re M.A.S.-Q & YE.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 213a.
125 See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(1).
126 See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2).
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The age of the child at the time of an appeal factored into a decision
by the Supreme Court a year before B.R. C.M. II, which dismissed the
appeal of O.I.C.L., who "aged out" of juvenile court jurisdiction by
turning 18 during the lengthy appeal, thus "mooting" the appeal. 127
In an opinion written by Justice Polston, joined by concurring
B.R.C.M. H centrist Justice Lewis and dissenting B.R.C.M. II
Justices Canady and Quince, the court held that O.I.C.L's argument
that the lower court had failed to consider whether he was dependent
pursuant to section 39.01(15)(e), was now moot, as he had reached
the age of majority while the appeal was pending. 128 The court
considered the 18th birthday as a "change in circumstances ...
thereby making it impossible for the court to provide effectual relief,"
as the dispositive factor in the mootness dismissal. 129 The fact that
the court's mootness analysis would now preclude O.I.C.L. from
qualifying for SIJS was seen as a "collateral legal consequence" of the
dependency adjudication and was of no concern to the majority. 130
Dismissing a dependency petition because it alleged that the
parental abandonment occurred too long ago to qualify for
adjudication of dependency in the present, and dismissing an appeal
because the appellant was no longer a "child" under Florida law,
again in the present, 131 were judicial artifices, imposing temporal
inelasticity into statutory definitions while overlooking the statute's
purposes and intent. 132  Implying that "abandonment" at the
inception of a child's life was not relevant to the child's dependency
status as an adolescent, implied that past events themselves, no
matter how grave, were not worthy of the court's consideration. 1 33
Also, holding that a child could not have his appeal decided on the
127 See O.I.C.L. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (O.I.C.L. 11), 205 So. 3d 575, 579 (Fla.
2016).
128 See id. at 578, 579 (citing Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 2012); Lund v. Dep't
of Health, 708 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
129 See O.I.C.L. II, 205 So. 3d at 578 (citing Lund, 708 So. 2d at 646).
130 See O.. C.L. II, 205 So. 3d at 579 ("Accordingly, the fact that obtaining a state court order
of child dependency is a first step in potentially securing SIJ status from the federal
government at a later date does not change our mootness analysis by transforming the
immigration context into a collateral legal consequence. Florida courts simply cannot declare
an individual over 18 years of age to be a dependent child under current Florida law.").
131 See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(12) ("Child" or "youth" is an unmarried person under the age of 18
who has not been emancipated by the court); O.I.C.L. II, 205 So. 3d at 579; In re M.A.S.-Q. &
Y.E.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 213a (11th Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 2013).
s32 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(d) ("The purposes of this chapter are ... [tlo provide a
child protection system that is sensitive to the social and cultural diversity of the state.").
Chapter 39 is to be "liberally interpreted and construed in conformity with its declared
purposes." FLA. STAT. § 39.001(12); accord B.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 887 So. 2d
1046, 1052 (Fla. 2004); In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
133 See, e.g., In re E.G.S.-H., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 639b (11th Cir. Ct. Jan. 27, 2015).
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merits because he had reached age 18 during a lengthy appeal,
implied that he never really was a "child" whose past abandonment
or neglect was worthy of the court's consideration.1 3 4
Some of the judicial resistance as I describe it in this Article could
be seen as a deliberate effort to diminish, or even nullify, the state
court's important, but limited, role in the cooperative federalism
scheme of SIJS.13 5 In its more extreme form, the judges questioned
the fundamental premise of the federal statute that juveniles be
134 Chief Justice Labarga's dissent articulated the view that "[a]lthough O.J.C.L. has already
reached majority age, '[ilt is well settled that mootness does not destroy an appellate court's
jurisdiction ... when the questions raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur."'
O.I.C.L. II, 205 So. 3d at 579 (Labarga, J., dissenting) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217,
218 n.1 (Fla. 1984)) (citing Del Valle v. State, 80 So. 3d 999, 1005 (Fla. 2011)). Justice Polston
and the majority disputed this characterization, and offered O.I.C.L. consolation that his now
mooted question of great public importance would eventually be addressed in a future case, but
not his case. See O.I.C.L. II, 205 So. 3d at 579 ("In re B.R.C.M. . . addresses an issue that is
very similar to the issue in this case, but the Third District's decision involves a child who is
currently less than 18 years of age. Therefore, the legal questions raised are not likely to evade
appellate review, and we cannot ignore the mootness of this particular case.").
Notably, the court's dismissal on mootness grounds overlooked authority to overturn a trial
court's order of dismissal, and direct adjudication nunc pro tunc to the date of the original
ruling, a common practice in dependency cases. See, e.g., F.L.M. v. Dep't of Children &
Families, 912 So. 2d 1264, 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) ("The judge in question having since
retired, we therefore return this case to a successor judge with instructions to enter an order
nunc pro tunc declaring the child dependent under Florida law and further providing that the
Department's responsibility over him necessarily terminated when he attained the age of 18.");
see also L.T. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 48 So. 3d 928, 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(following the holding in F.L.M that the petition was not moot) (citing F.L.M, 912 So. 2d at
1269). Had the O.I C.L. II majority taken this authority into account, it would also provide a
basis for the dependency court to not only adjudicate O.I.C.L. dependent, but to retain
jurisdiction over him well past his 18th birthday. See FLA. STAT. § 39.5075(6) (authorizing
dependency court to retain jurisdiction past age 18, through age 22, over an immigrant
dependent child who has a "petition and application" for SIJS pending with USCIS and to
conduct "[r]eview hearings for the child . . . for the purpose of determining the status of the
petition and application" until the final decision, which terminates the jurisdiction.).
Instead of seeing multiple benefits to O.I.C.L of a dependency adjudication post-age of
majority, the majority chose to emphasize this statutory-extended jurisdiction grant as "solely
for the purpose of allowing the continued consideration of the [SIJ status] petition and
application by federal authorities." O.L C.L. II, 205 So. 3d at 578. But there would be more
than just immigration benefits post-18 for O.I.C.L. As an adjudicated dependent child, now a
young adult, he could continue to receive services in the form of supportive living, case
management, and stipends from DCF after turning 18. See FLA. STAT. § 39.6251 (extended
foster care until age 21); FLA. STAT. § 409.1451(2) (post-secondary education support and
aftercare services until age 23); FLA. STAT. § 1009.25(1)(c) (post-secondary education tuition
waiver benefits until age 28); FLA. STAT. § 409.903(4) (medical benefits, including Medicaid
eligibility until age 21); FLA. STAT. § 409.1676(1) (access to specialized medical and therapeutic
programs for children with extraordinary needs).
135 See, e.g., In re K.B.L.V., 176 So. 3d 297, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Shepherd, J.,
specially concurring) ("Despite the long settled understanding in our federal system that
'[plolicies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are .. . entrusted
exclusively to Congress,' . . . the United States Congress, for reasons of its own, has decreed
that our stamp of approval is a sine qua non for consideration by the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services of a child's request for SJIS status [sic] and permanent residency.").
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permitted (indeed, were required) to seek relief in state court as a
prerequisite to SIJ status.1 s6 More mainstream skeptical questioning
did not attack the facial requirement that the state court play its
designated role in the federalism scheme. 137 But their Chapter 39
analysis relied on statutory construction that reified the courts' social
or political constructs about immigrants and immigration policy,
rather than the intent of the legislature, in assuring that all children
in the state were entitled to individualized hearings on petitions
alleging abuse, abandonment or neglect under Florida law. 138
Imputing ill intent to the children or their counsel, making sweeping
generalizations about them as children, and disparaging the quality
of their allegations of maltreatment were political statements, as
much as they were judicial pronouncements. 13 9
136 See, e.g., O.I.C.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families (O.LC.L. 1), 169 So. 3d 1224, 1250 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("[J]udicial resources too often are being misused to obtain dependency
orders for minors who are neither abused, neglected, or abandoned, and who seek a dependency
adjudication and best-interest order not because they are endangered and need protection but
because they want preferential immigration treatment without having to comply with the
requirements of the customary legal immigration process."); In re B.Y.G.M., 176 So. 3d 290,
293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("It is understood that B.Y.G.M. filed her petition to secure SIJS,
and that she did not do so in order to obtain relief from abuse, abandonment, or neglect."); In
re K.B.L. V., 176 So. 3d at 301 (Shepherd, J., specially concurring) ("It is as if we are customs
agents, although the federal government will make the final decision.... However, we are not
yet colonies or territories of the United States government. We correctly decline to subordinate
ourselves to the whim of the United States Congress in this case."); In re E.G.S.-H., 22 Fla. L.
Weekly Supp. 693b ("While the Court is sympathetic to the plight of alien minors who desire
and seek nothing more than the opportunity of a better life, my role is not to set immigration
policy or decide whether, as a humanitarian gesture, any particular alien child should be
permitted to stay in the United States.").
137 See, e.g., O.L C.L. II, 205 So. 3d at 578 ("While'a state court's adjudication of dependency
or other custody determination is the first step in the process of obtaining SIJ status,' federal
immigration law 'then requires additional findings, which may come from any judicial or
administrative body."') (quoting In re Y V., 160 So. 3d at 580).
13s See O.I.C.L. I, 169 So. 3d at 1248 (citing Vrchota Corp. v. Kelly, 42 So. 3d 319, 322 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010); see also State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2001) (first quoting State
v. Cohen, 696 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); and then quoting State v. Brigham,
694 So. 2d 793, 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)) ("[Florida courts] are 'without power to construe
an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its
reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.
This principle . . . reflects the constitutional obligation of the judiciary to respect the separate
powers of the legislature."); Fast Track Framing, Inc. v. Carabello, 994 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008) ("[W]hen interpreting a statute, it is not the judiciary's prerogative to
question the merit of a policy preference or to substitute its preference for the legislature's
judgment.").
13s See, e.g., O.LC.L. I, 169 So. 3d at 1247 (citing Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. Y.C.,
82 So. 3d 1139, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added) ("At their core, these petitions
are probably best described as 'merely an unopposed request for the assistance of the court,' . . .
for entry of orders to help a child obtain legal immigration status."); In re B. Y.G.M., 176 So. 3d
at 294 (Shepherd, J., concurring) (emphasis added) ("In these cases, the express purpose of the
petition is to obtain an adjudication of dependency, based on abuse, abandonment, or neglect,
as a predicate to requesting special immigrant status for the purpose of seeking lawful
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Justice Lawson's concurrence intimated that Florida's courts were
being inundated by immigrant children overwhelming the state
courts' limited capacities and resources. 140 His concern echoed prior
warnings by circuit and appellate judges that "many" cases were
being initiated by immigrant children from Central America flooding
the dependency courts with questionable or even illegitimate claims
of dependency. 141 Consciously or not, these warnings also echoed the
rhetoric in countless Trump administration pronouncements and
tweets that the federal political asylum system was being overrun
and taxed to the limit by "meritless" asylum applications filed by
large numbers of migrants arriving at the border in caravans
originating in Central America. 142 Whether the alarms being
sounded were about securing the border and limiting asylum
applications, or securing the courthouse to limit meritless
dependency-SIJS filings, immigrants were viewed as unworthy of fair
treatment and individualized attention by our government and
courts. 1 4 3 State courts portray these cases as a part of a massive
influx tended to convey the message that individual children like
B.R.C.M. were not truly victims of abuse in their homelands but were
in fact predators, fraudulently pursuing immigration benefits from
the dependency courts.1 44 Similar generalities have abounded in the
permanent residence in the United States.").
140 See B.R.C.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (B.R.C.M. Il), 215 So. 3d 1219, 1224
(Lawson, J., specially concurring).
141 See, e.g., Order Requiring Briefing & Scheduling Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 1
(emphasis added) ('This case is one of many initiated by a 'Private Petition for Dependency'
filed on behalf of alien children .... ); see also Sarah Rogerson, The Politics of Fear:
Unaccompanied Immigrant Children and the Case of the Southern Border, 61 VILL. L. REV. 843,
850-53 (2016) (describing and refuting fears of unaccompanied Central American children
flooding into the U.S.).
142 See, e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOJ AND DHS ISSUE NEW ASYLUM RULE: APPLIES
PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND ENTRY To ASYLUM (2018), https://www.justice.gov/opalpr
/doj-and-dhs-issue-new-asylum-rule ("Our asylum system is overwhelmed with too many
meritless ... claims from aliens who place a tremendous burden on our resources, preventing
us from being able to expeditiously grant asylum to those who truly deserve it."); Abigail
Abrams, President Trump Says He Wants to Limit Asylum Seekers. Experts Say He's on Shaky
Legal Ground, TIME (Nov. 1, 2018), http://time.com/5442286/trump-seeks-limit-asylum-seekers
-legal-questions/.
143 See, e.g., Antonio Olivo, For a Special Visa, Young Immigrants Need a Judge to Rule
They've Been Abandoned. Some Judges Refuse to Decide., WASH. POST (May 17, 2017), https://w
ww.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/to-apply-for-a-special-visa-young-immigrants-
need-a-judge-to-rule-they-have-been-abandoned-some-local-judges-are-refusing-to-decide/201
7/05/17/11f4900c-35a8-11e7-b412-62beef8l2lf7_story.html?utmterm=.1fe8e5d91580 ("Critics
of the [SIJS] visa program have raised similar concerns, alleging that some immigrant parents
are making false claims of mistreatment in hopes of keeping their children from being sent
back to their homelands, and that in many cases the journey to the U.S. is arranged by both
parents.").
144 See, e.g., B.R.C.M I, 182 So. 3d 749, 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting In re KB.L.V.,
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migrant crisis-infused rhetoric of border policy. 1 4 5
These narratives of faceless illegal alien hordes rather than
individual children-many of whom have suffered serious abuse and
neglect in their home countries-depersonalize and dehumanize
them, treating them as second-class children unworthy of the
protections of the dependency courts. 146 But the purposes of Florida
dependency law, as listed in Chapter 39, are not undermined when
children such as B.R.C.M ask the courts for adjudications of
dependency.1 47 To the contrary, federal and state law work together
to ensure that "vulnerable" children like this are protected.1 48 Thus
it is essential to appreciate and understand the federal SIJS statute
and its interplay with state law, which provide these children an
176 So. 3d 297, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Shepherd, J., specially concurring)). The myth
of the "superpredator" is a pervasive theme in the history of juvenile court. See generally Tamar
R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney, 58
B.C. L. REV. 379, 388 (2017). The fear-driven portrayals by judges of hordes of Central
American children stampeding into their courts for SIJS could be seen as a stereotyping and
racializing of the children, adding a new dimension to the structural racism that pervades this
institution.
145 See Susan M. Akram, Are They Human Children or Just Border Rats?, 15 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 187, 188 (2006); Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social
and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 268-69, 273, 276
(1997).
146 See, e.g., Akram, supra note 145, at 188; Johnson, supra note 145, at 269 ("Today's
faceless 'illegal aliens' are invading the nation and must be stopped or we shall be destroyed.
Such images help animate, invigorate, and reinforce the move to bolster immigration
enforcement efforts and seal the borders.").
147 See In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("[Chapter 39] provides a
lengthy list of purposes, the first of which is '[t]o provide for the care, safety, and protection of
children."'). In enacting this statutory scheme, the legislature also sought to: "ensure secure
and safe custody" of children; "prevent the occurrence of child abuse, neglect, and
abandonment"; provide children with protection "from abuse, abandonment, neglect, and
exploitation"; provide children "[a] permanent and stable home"; and provide children "[a] safe
and nurturing environment which will preserve a sense of personal dignity and integrity." FLA.
STAT. §§ 39.001(1)(a), (3)(a)-(c) (2018). The Chapter also expressly conveys the legislature's
determination that "it is the state's responsibility to ensure that factors impeding the ability of
caregivers to fulfill their responsibilities are identified through the dependency process and
that appropriate recommendations and services to address those problems are considered in
any judicial or nonjudicial proceeding," and "that the prevention of child abuse, abandonment,
and neglect shall be a priority of this state." FLA. STAT. §§ 39.001(7)-(8).
148 See Memorandum from Lori Scialabba, USCIS Deputy Director, Response to
Recommendation 47, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJ) Adjudications: An Opportunity
for Adoption of Best Practices (July 13, 2011), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files[USCIS
/Resources/Ombudsman%2OLiaison/Responses%20to%2OFormal%2ORecommendations
/cisomb-2011-response47.pdf ("USCIS appreciates the sensitivity and urgency surrounding
these cases and makes every effort to provide the proper attention to this vulnerable
population."); see also David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of
Children's Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 1004 (2002) [hereinafter
Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids?] ("[SIJS] created a unique hybrid system of state and federal
collaboration, drawing on state child welfare expertise to complement INS expertise in
immigration matters.").
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opportunity to seek best interest orders in dependency and other
state court proceedings as a predicate for SIJS.
E. Federal SIJS Framework in B.R. C.M. IF49
Congress introduced SIJS into law through the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1990, to "provide a gateway for undocumented
children who have been abused, neglected, or abandoned to obtain
lawful permanent residency in the United States."150 The statute
was amended in 2008 as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA"). 15 1 Through this amendment,
Congress increased the availability of SIJS relief by replacing the
requirement that the child be "eligible . . . for long-term foster care,"
with the condition that "reunification with 1 or both of the
immigrant's parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law."1 5 2 Although
this amendment expanded eligibility for SIJS, it remains a limited
form of relief, accounting for only about .5 percent of cases for lawful
149 This section has been adapted from the amicus curiae brief submitted by three Miami
Law clinics in B.R.C.M See Brief of Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law Children & Youth Clinic et al.
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10-19, B.R.C.M. v. Florida Dept. of Children &
Families, No. SC16-179 (Fla. Sept. 16, 2016); infra Part VII.
150 In re Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 715 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); see also
Yeboah v. United States Dep't. of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3rd Cir. 2003) (describing the
purpose of SIJS). Responding to concerns about fraud, Congress amended the statute in 1997
to prevent "juveniles entering the United States as visiting students" from taking advantage
of its provisions. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat.
2440, 2460; Yeboah, 345 F.3d at 221.
151 See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044, 5079.
152 See id. at 5079; see also H.S.P. v. J.K., 121 A.3d 849, 851-52 (N.J. 2015) ("In this appeal,
we examine the role of our state courts in making the predicate findings necessary for a non-
citizen child to apply for 'special immigrant juvenile' (SIJ) status under the Immigration Act of
1990, as amended by the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2008."). Compare § 113, 111 Stat. at 2460 ("Section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J)) is amended to read as follows: '(J) an immigrant
who is present in the United States-'(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court
located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under
the custody of, an agency or department of a State and who has been deemed eligible by that
court for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment . . . ."), with 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2019) ("The term 'special immigrant' means-(J) an immigrant who is present
in the United States-(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the
United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of,
an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile
court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant's
parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State
law .... ).
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permanent status adjudicated by USCIS each year.153
Applying for SIJS status is a two-step process. First, an
immigrant child must qualify for, and obtain, a state court order
making findings that:
(1) The child "[i]s under twenty-one years of age;"
(2) The child "[i]s unmarried;"
(3) The child "has been declared dependent on a juvenile
court," or the court has "legally committed" the child
or placed the child "under the custody of. . . an
individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile
court;"
(4) "[R]eunification with 1 or both of the immigrant's
parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State
law;" and
(5) It is not in the child's "best interest" to be returned
to his or her home country. 154
Congress delegated these factual findings to state courts, in
recognition of the expertise of states in child welfare
determinations.1 5 5 A state dependency court's role in the SIJS
application process is limited to adjudicating the petition for
15 See CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, A TREACHEROUS JOURNEY: CHILD MIGRANTS
NAVIGATING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 38 (2014). In 2012, for example, USCIS received
only 2,959 SIJS petitions. See id. In 2014, USCIS received 5,776 petitions for SIJS status.
See U.S. DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC., NUMBER OF 1-360 PETITIONS FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT WITH
A CLASSIFICATION OF SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE (SIJ) BY FISCAL YEAR AND CASE STATUS
2010-2016 (2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/filesUSCIS/Resources/Reports%20and
%20Studies/Immigration%2OForms%2OData/Adjustment%20of%2OStatus/I360-sij
performancedatafy2016_qtr4.pdf. The total number of applications for SIJS-lawful
permanent residence status granted in 2017 was 4,681 [hereinafter NUMBER OF 1-360
PETITIONS]. See U.S. DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS:
TABLE 7 (2017), https://ww w.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2017/table7 [hereinafter
2017 YEARBOOK: TABLE 7].
154 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2019). The implementing
regulations for SIJS have not been updated to reflect the 2008 statutory amendments. For
example, the regulations still include reference to a child's eligibility for "long-term foster care,"
a phrase defined federally as requiring that reunification with both of the child's parents not
be viable. See § 204.11(a).
155 See Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, Elian or Alien? The Contradictions of Protecting
Undocumented Children Under the Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute, 27 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 597, 609, 613 (2000) ("The reliance upon state juvenile courts anticipated in the SIJ
statutory scheme signals Congress' recognition that the state retain primary responsibility and
administrative competency to protect child welfare.").
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dependency and requests for factual findings. 15 6 Other visa options
such as visas for undocumented immigrant victims of domestic
violence through the Violence Against Women Act15 7 and U Visas for
undocumented victims of certain crimes, 15 8 may also rely on the state
court to make certain predicate findings but the court's role in SIJS
is mandatory. 159 While the state court plays a key role in the process,
its "role . . . is not to determine worthy candidates for citizenship, but
simply to identify abused, neglected, or abandoned alien children
under its jurisdiction."1 60  Theoretically, the adjudication of
dependency should be based on the same legal standard for both
citizen and immigrant children.
If and when the state court makes the requisite factual findings,
the child may file a petition with USCIS, which has authority to
approve or deny SIJS.1 6 1 In considering whether to approve such a
petition, USCIS will consider, among other things, whether the
application is bona fide, meaning that SIJS is being sought to protect
the child from abuse, neglect, or abandonment.1 62 If USCIS grants
SIJS, the child may apply for lawful permanent residency, assuming
that the child meets all additional eligibility criteria.163 This short
course in SIJS law serves as a frame for understanding B.R. C.M. II
16 See H.S.P., 121 A.3d at 852 ("The [state court] plays a critical role in a minor immigrant's
attempt to obtain SIJ status but that role is closely circumscribed.... The [court] does not
have jurisdiction to grant or deny applications for immigration relief."); In re Avila Luis, 114
N.E.3d 855, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) ("[A] state court's role in the SIJ process is not to determine
worthy candidates for citizenship, but simply to identify abused, neglected, or abandoned alien
children under its jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent or be safely returned in their
best interests to their home country.").
157 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
40701, 108 Stat. 1796, 1953-54.
1s See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §
1502, 114 Stat. 1464, 1518. The U visa is incorporated in the section of this Act and is referred
to as the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1518. See Theo Liebmann, Ethical Advocacy for Immigrant Survivors of Family Crisis, 50 FAM.
CT. REV. 650, 653 (2012) [hereinafter Liebmann, Ethical Advocacy].
159 See Liebmann, Ethical Advocacy, supra note 158, at 652-54, 654 tbl.1.
16o Leslie H. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); see also U.S.
DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC., SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS: INFORMATION FOR JUVENILE
COURTS, https://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/Information forJuvenileCourts_-FINAL
%20%281%29.pdf. ("[J]uvenile judges should note that providing an order does not grant SIJ
status or a 'Green Card'-only USCIS can grant or deny these benefits. The role of the court is
to make factual findings based on state law about the abuse, neglect, or abandonment; family
reunification; and best interests of the child.").
161 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b), (e).
162 See U.S. DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC., HQOPS 70/8.5, TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2008: SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS PROVISIONS 3 (2009),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/StaticFilesMemoranda
/2009/TVPRASIJ.pdf.
163 See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c); U.S. DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 160.
Albany Law Review
and other cases involving the federal law. In the next parts, I
evaluate some of the ways that state judges before and since that
decision was rendered have applied and misapplied the federal law.
III. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS: A JUDGE BEHAVING BADLY
[W]hen someone comes into my courtroom and says I am here
illegally, I have a duty to report that, as any U.S. citizen would
do....
-Florida Circuit Judge Roger Colton.164
A. The Judicial Misbehavior
In 2004, in a Florida Circuit Court in Palm Beach County, Judge
Roger Colton denied a petition for dependency filed on behalf of an
undocumented immigrant child from Central America alleging abuse
and neglect. 165 During the hearing, the judge also refused to consider
or grant the child's motion for a best interest order to qualify for
SIJS.166 After the child left the courtroom with her pro bono lawyer,
the judge wrote down the names, addresses and birthdates of the
child and her family, and faxed this information over to the U.S.
Border Patrol. 167
When the incident hit the media, the judge defended himself,
proclaiming: "[t]hey're violating the law, and I'm a judge .... Don't I
have some type of obligation to the system to report it . . . when it's
smack-dab right out in front of me?" 168 A short time later, in an
appearance on The O'Reilly Factor, the judge elaborated:
The reason I turned them over is because I have a sworn duty
as a circuit judge to uphold not only the Constitution of the
State of Florida but also the Constitution of the United States,
and, when someone comes into my courtroom and says I am
here illegally, I have a duty to report that, as any U.S. citizen
would do, and, therefore, I have decided that, if you come in
the front of me and you say I shouldn't be here, I'm illegal,
164 See Interview by Bill O'Reilly with Roger Colton, Florida Circuit Judge, The O'Reilly
Factor (21t Century Fox Jan. 28, 2004) [hereinafter The O'Reilly Factor Transcript].
165 See, e.g., Memorandum from [lawyer's name withheld at request] to Fifteen Coal.
Members 2 (Apr. 27, 2004) (on file with author).
166 See id.
167 See Judge Accused ofAbusing Power by Reporting Immigrant Children, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 19, 2004, at 8B [hereinafter Judge Accused of Abusing Power].
168 See id.
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then I will report that individual to the U.S. Border Patrol for
whatever appropriate action they see fit.1 6 9
In explaining why he reported children to INS, Judge Colton
leveled two complaints about the cases that have become standard
lines of attack in the recent judicial pushback against alien children
petitioning courts in Florida for dependency adjudications. He
complained about older children (i.e., 17-year-olds) seeking
dependency adjudications in order to "have a leg up, so to speak, for
a special immigrant visa and hopefully to avoid deportation." 170 The
judge's view that older children were not really "children" has been a
recurring objection to their petitions, as noted above.171  The
disparaging views voiced by Judge Colton about the circumstances of
these older children and their reasons for filing petitions in their
teenage years, made broad assumptions about them that did not
necessarily reflect their realities as individual children.1 72 The fact
169 The O'Reilly Factor Transcript, supra note 164, at 1.
170 Id.
17n See O.I.C.L. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (O.I.C.L. II), 205 So. 3d 575, 578 (Fla.
2016); see also O.I.C.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families (O.I.C.L. 1), 169 So. 3d 1244, 1247 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("These types of petitions ... routinely share the following common
elements: the child is about to turn eighteen years old; the Department of Children and
Families ('DCF') neither supports nor opposes the child's petition; the child agrees not to seek
any services from the State; one or more of the child's parents sign consent forms agreeing to
entry of a dependency order; no testimony is presented to the court opposing the petition; and,
DCF files no briefs in any subsequent appeal.").
172 See, e.g., O.I.C.L. II, 205 So. 3d at 580 (Labarga, C.J., dissenting) ("[S]eventeen-year-olds
are the most frequent SIJS applicants-from 1999 to 2012, the median age has hovered
between seventeen and eighteen annually, with an overall median age of 17.4. ")(quoting Laila
Mass, States & Status: A Study of Geographical Disparities for Immigrant Youth, 46 COLUM.
HuM. RTS. L.REV. 266,290 (2014)). The O.I.C.L. II dissent elaborated on this statistical finding,
quoting Hass's survey of the implementation of the SIJS law across multiple jurisdictions,
which found that there were many reasons why state court petitions were often filed shortly
before the child reached the age of majority:
First, the average age of unaccompanied minors entering the country is around sixteen or
seventeen, and ... many of these youths are SIJS eligible. Further, for someone who has
not been apprehended by the immigration agency, this is the age at which he may consider
getting a driver's license or taking college entrance tests. These events can trigger a
realization that he is unauthorized, because he does not have the required identification.
At this point, he may be more likely to seek help and get screened for eligibility. Lastly,
age seventeen might be so common because many state laws lose jurisdiction over youths
at age eighteen, so SIJS-eligible youths eighteen and older may not be able to obtain the
predicate state court order and therefore never apply for federal immigration protection.
These hypotheses are certainly not exhaustive, but they are reflective of the conventional
understanding of child advocates.
Id.; see also Emily Rose Gonzalez, Battered Immigrant Youth Take the Beat: Special Immigrant
Juveniles Permitted to Age-Out of Status, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 409, 410 (2009) (discussing
the SIJS "aging-out" predicament).
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that the child filed a petition for dependency a few months before
turning 18 was not a proper basis for presuming that the petition
was illegitimate, fraudulent or lacked merit.
In his O'Reilly appearance, Judge Colton also cited one instance of
an "illegal alien" who had come to his court
admittedly so, to try to get medical care from the United States-
and it was decided, well, maybe we could put him into a special
school, and I made up my mind, well, why should we be giving
that individual the opportunity for that slot when we have U.S.
citizens who are trying to get into a school also? 173
The complaint that allowing a foreign-born child to petition for
dependency adjudication and seek services would thereby deprive
more deserving U.S. citizen children of their entitlement to medical
or educational benefits, was another recurring, zero-sum objection
voiced by judges. 174 It was also one of the reasons why advocates
made prudential, strategic decisions not to ask for any state services
in their dependency filings. But if the petition did not seek services,
the courts would take a dismissive posture that the child was not
truly "dependent." 175 Yet if the petition did make a claim for services,
this would spark another negative reaction from judges, i.e., that the
services would deplete the state's resources intended to assist
deserving citizen children. 176 This damned if you do, damned if you
don't (seek services) criticism leveled by different judges was a
paradoxical thread running through the recent spate of state court
SIJS litigation. It was one of the key objections animating the Florida
court trend of summarily dismissing petitions filed by immigrant
children through their pro bono counsel, particularly when the
petition sought no assistance from the state.177
173 The O'Reilly Factor Transcript, supra note 164, at 1.
174 See id. The view also revealed the judge's glaring lack of understanding of equal
protection precedent guaranteeing immigrant children access to certain public benefits and the
right to a public education. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (state cannot deny
K-12 public education to undocumented children because undocumented children are a quasi-
suspect class and public education is a quasi-fundamental right); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 366, 382 (1971) (quoting United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971) (state statute
denying welfare benefits to resident aliens and aliens who had not resided in the U.S. for a
specified number of years violated the Equal Protection Clause).
175 See, e.g., In re B.R.C.M. (B.R.C.M. 1), 182 So. 3d 749, 751, 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)
(quoting la re K.B.L.V., 176 So. 3d 297, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Shepherd, J., specially
concurring).
176 See The O'Reilly Factor Transcript, supra note 164, at 1; Cleek, supra note 12.
177 See The O'Reilly Factor Transcript, supra note 164, at 3; Cleek, supra note 12.
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The fact that the child did not simultaneously seek services from
the state did not signify that this was a meritless dependency case
under Florida law.1 78 In fact, nothing in the statutes or rules
governing a petition for an adjudication of dependency requires that
any kind or quantum of services be sought from the state. 179
Furthermore, the trial court is free to order services to the child and
family at the post-adjudicatory dispositional hearing, regardless of
whether the child asks for services.180
When asked by the host about why he was making this appearance
on the O'Reilly program to explain and defend his actions, he likened
it to "speak[ing] to the Rotary Club or the Kiwanis Club, and ... that
I have a duty as a judge to help educate the public about our
jurisprudence system and particularly the system of law in the State
of Florida, as I see it."181 Much of what the judge offered to the
O'Reilly audience had very little to do with educating the public and
was more his partisan opinion about "illegal aliens,"182 tainted by
personal bias and prejudice. 183 To make an obvious point, an
appearance on a politically conservative pundit's show on a
conservative cable network is nothing like an appearance before an
178 See, e.g., In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187, 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citing F.L.M. v. Dep't
of Children & Families, 912 So. 2d 1264, 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)). Florida appellate
courts have uniformly held that a child who makes "no request for services" may nonetheless
be "dependent"-as defined by FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)-and that a finding to the contrary would
encourage immigrant children to deplete state resources available for "other needy children."
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15); In re T.J., 59 So. 3d at 1191 n.5 (quoting F.L.M., 912 So. 2d at 1270).
179 See FLA. STAT. § 39.501(3)(a).
1so See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.521(1)(b) (2018).
181 The O'Reilly Factor Transcript, supra note 164, at 2. Several of the judge's statements
on the O'Reilly program did not accurately describe "our jurisprudence system" or even the law
in this area, which certainly cast doubt on and eroded public confidence in his abilities as a
member of the judiciary and especially his impartiality as a judicial officer presiding over
claims concerning "illegal alien" children and families. As pointed out in Part IIIB infra, he
had no apparent awareness that he was prohibited by federal and Florida law from sharing
information contained in his court files with the Border Patrol or any other federal immigration
entity, and was under a strict duty to preserve the confidentiality of the proceedings over which
he presided as a state judge, subject to very limited exceptions granted under state or federal
law.
182 See id. at 1-3. The judge used the words "illegal" or "illegally" seven times to describe
immigrants or aliens during his short interview with O'Reilly, as recorded in the three-page
transcript of his interview. See id.
183 See FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4A(1)-(2) (2019); id. cmt. Canon 4A ("A
judge is encouraged to participate in activities designed to improve the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice. In doing so, however, it must be understood that expressions
of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge's judicial activities, may cast reasonable
doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge and may undermine the
independence and integrity of the judiciary."); FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4 cmt.
Canon 4B (emphasis added) ("Judges are encouraged to participate in efforts to promote the
fair administration of justice, the independence of the judiciary and the integrity of the legal
profession. . . .").
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apolitical civic organization. Moreover, given that he was presiding
over these cases, and in a later conversation mentioned that three of
his rulings involving undocumented immigrants were on appeal, and
thus theoretically could be remanded to him, he really had no
business commenting on these questions to the press or the public.1 84
But the judge doubled down to O'Reilly regarding his actions and
pledged to continue on his crusade: "I'm reporting illegal activities to
the appropriate authorities."185 The fact that he used his judicial
office to turn over undocumented immigrants to Border Patrol and
INS, and thus flouted the law and his judicial obligations of
impartiality and independence, did not seem to trouble him in the
least. 186
B. The Response by Advocates
Immigrant advocates reacted to Judge Colton's acts and public
proclamations with alarm. A board member of the American
Immigration Lawyers Association called the practice "shocking," and
said, "[h]e's taken upon himself a duty he was not sworn to do. . . .
He's a state court judge enforcing federal law." 187 A Palm Beach Post
editorial accused the judge of "overstepping his bounds when he
preempts the opportunity of abused children to request
dependency."18 8
Florida advocates formed a coalition to respond to the judge's
184 See FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3B(9) ("A judge shall not, while a proceeding
is pending or impending in any court, make any public comment that might reasonably be
expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might
substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing."). See also Phyllis Williams Kotey, The Real
Costs of Judicial Misconduct: Florida Taking a Step Ahead in the Regulation of Judicial Speech
and Conduct to Ensure Independence, Integrity, and Impartiality, 31 NOVA L. REV. 645, 685
(2007) (citing an instance of a Florida judge removed from his position as a Chief Judge of a
circuit court for making public statements that undermined the public's confidence in the
judge's impartiality).
15 See The O'Reilly Factor Transcript, supra note 164, at 1. As if to demonstrate that this
was not a one-sided explanation of the law and the jurisprudence system by this opinionated
judge, the Fox program featured a counterpoint appearance by Jeff Devore, a Palm Beach
immigration lawyer critical of the judge's acts and the views that he expressed to the program
audience. See id. at 1-2.
156 See id. at 1. But cf. Aimee Green, Judge Didn't Violate Rules in Letting Immigrant Leave
Through Back Door, Review Finds, OREGONIAN (June 19, 2017), https://www.oregonlive.com
/portlandlindex.ssf/2017/06/court -officials -find -no -violat.html (judge who permitted
undocumented alien to elude federal agents waiting outside of her courtroom, giving alien exit
through the back door, found by trial court administrator in the Multnomah County Oregon
Circuit Court administrator's office not to have abused Oregon judicial canons).
187 Susan Spencer-Wendel, Judge's Reports to Border Patrol Roil Legal Waters, PALM BEACH
POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at 1A.
188 Opinion-Editorial: A Judge Goes Too Far, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 26, 2004, at 10A.
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actions and public statements.189 Rather than target just one rogue
judge, we decided to educate all of the state's judges handling
dependency, family custody, and guardianship cases about the
confidentiality requirements of abuse and neglect law.190 My clinic
students and I prepared a legal memorandum that was incorporated
into a letter that we sent to these judges. 191
The letter advised them that judges were prohibited from
contacting federal authorities about the immigration status of
undocumented children in dependency court and similar
proceedings. 192 It detailed federal and state laws mandating the
preservation of confidentiality for these court proceedings and the
policies underlying the prohibitions against such contacts. 193 We
apprised Judge Colton and the other judges that this practice also
violated DCF's Florida Alien Child Rule, which was promulgated
nine years earlier, in 1995.194 This rule forbade state officials from
189 See Memorandum from Florida's Children First!, Inc. to All Florida Circuit Judges
Assigned to Juvenile, Family, and Probate Divisions 1 (Apr. 17, 2004) [hereinafter
Memorandum from Florida's Children First] (on file with author).
190 See id. Best interest orders for SIJS can be sought in a variety of a state court actions,
including child custody, guardianship/conservatorship, abuse/neglect, juvenile delinquency,
and divorce/child support. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(6), (d)(2)(iii) (2019); Liebmann, Ethical
Advocacy, supra note 158, at 656 ("In SIJ cases, for example, family reunification and a child's
best interests are findings that establish eligibility for relief; both of these determinations are
made regularly in dependency, adoption, guardianship, and other proceedings, and lawyers
must be extensively familiar with the procedural and substantive bases for making arguments
related to those issues.").
Depending on the state, a "family court," "probate court," or "district court" may be vested
with the authority to make the requisite orders for SIJ eligibility. See, e.g., Gao v. Jenifer, 185
F.3d 548, 551, 557 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming Michigan probate court's exercise of jurisdiction
over child and the determination that child was a dependent of the court); Arteaga v. Texas
Dep't. of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 924 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Tex. App. 1996) (noting that
district court of Texas took jurisdiction over minor, declared her a ward of the court, and thus
enabled her to obtain SIJ status).
191 See Memorandum from Florida's Children First, supra note 189, at 1.
192 See id. at 3; see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(8) (federal law only allows release of information
to another governmental agency for purposes directly connected with the administration of the
child's foster care permanency plan).
193 See Memorandum from Florida's Children First, supra note 189, at 1; see also FLA. STAT.
39.202 (2018) (records shall be kept confidential unless otherwise prescribed by Chapter 39);
FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(4)(a) (2018) (mandating confidentiality of juvenile court records); Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (b)(2)(B) (viii) (2019) (noting
that every state receiving grants under CAPTA must provide methods to preserve the
confidentiality of "all records in order to protect the rights of the child and of the child's parents
or guardians."); see also Matthew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and
the Master Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1, 30-33 (2010) (describing how
confidentiality laws operate in child welfare cases).
194 See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1OM-47.001 (1995) ("Alien Child Rule"); Memorandum
from Florida's Children First, supra note 189, at 3; see also Carolyn S. Salisbury, Comment,
The Legality of Denying State Foster Care to Illegal Alien Children: Are Abused and Abandoned
Children the First Casualties in America's War on Immigration?, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 633, 645
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reporting the child's or parents' identifying information to the INS,
irrespective of the outcome of the dependency proceeding.1 95
Although he had presided in dependency court for some time, Judge
Colton was unaware of the Florida Alien Child Rule and that it
barred sharing court records with the Border Patrol.1 96 The letter
explained that such contacts undermined the goals of the state child
protection system and would deter or chill children (and advocates)
from petitioning state courts for protection from parental abuse or
seeking SIJS.197
One of our group met with Judge Colton in chambers to explain our
position. We decided not to air our concerns in public to avoid
embarrassing the judge, who otherwise had a reputation for fairness
and evenhandedness in his dependency docket.1 98 A Palm Beach
County civil litigator agreed to be our diplomatic envoy to the judge,
whom he knew and had supported. The judge explained why he
reported the children to Border Patrol, but gave a somewhat different
account than what he told Bill O'Reilly's audience. He said the child
was point-blank not "dependent" under Florida law and implied that
the child's lawyers were underhanded in abusing the dependency
court for their clients. According to our colleague's post-meeting
account, Judge Colton implied "that the process was being subverted
in order to have this illegal immigrant obtain legal status in an illegal
way. . . . He had simply been put up to filing this petition by [his]
lawyer and the whole thing was a subterfuge." 199 Judge Colton's
(1996) (describing Florida's alien child rule's obligations to children).
195 See FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 1OM-47.001 (1995) ("[I]ntended to resolve ... [that]
Chapter[] 39 ... appli[ies] to all children in Florida without regard to alienage or immigration
status."); FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 1OM-47.002 (1995); FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 10M-47.003
(1995) (establishing certain procedures for handling alien children in child protection
proceedings). See generally Angela M. Elsperger, Florida's Battle With the Federal Government
Over Immigration Policy Holds Children Hostage: They Are Not Our Children!, 13 LAW & INEQ.
141, 144, 168 (1994) (summarizing history of Florida Alien Child Rule); Salisbury, supra note
194, at 645 (1996) (same).
196 See, e.g., Memorandum from [lawyer's name withheld at request] to 15 Coal. Members,
supra note 165, at 2.
197 See Memorandum from Florida's Children First, supra note 189, at 8; see also Chen,
supra note 155, at 626 ("[Fjederal confidentiality laws reinforce the well-established policies
regarding the treatment of [immigrant] minors who are the subject of child abuse, neglect, or
abandonment investigations.").
19s See Maxine Goodman, Three Likely Causes of Judicial Misbehavior and How These
Causes Should Inform Judicial Discipline, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 949, 995 (2013) [hereinafter
Goodman, Three Likely Causes] ("[D]iscipline that serves to humiliate and degrade the
offending judge may work against the judicial conduct agencies' goals of preventing judicial
misconduct and ensuring the integrity of the judiciary.").
199 Memorandum from [lawyer's name withheld at request] to 15 Coal. Members, supra note
165, at 2.
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complaints about these kinds of purported SIJS abuses have been
heard before and since, in various contexts. 200
In their conversation, Judge Colton moderated the tone of his more
inflammatory rhetoric on O'Reilly's program. He promised to read
our letter, especially the parts that called him out for violating the
children's confidentiality protections, and agreed to revisit this
practice after reviewing the legal analysis that we offered to give him.
He also invited us to file amicus briefs in three pending appeals
challenging similar acts. The meeting was described as cordial and
helpful.
Afterwards, Judge Colton ended his practice. He stopped turning
over undocumented immigrant children to the Border Patrol. Other
Florida judges tempted to follow his example were persuaded to
refrain. We viewed this voluntary cessation and the accompanying
silence as a victory, not only because the judge stopped targeting
alien children based on their alienage and immigration status, but
because he stopped being a negative role model for similarly-tempted
state court judges.
C. Advocacy Lessons Learned
We saw this episode as a cautionary tale about state judges who
take it upon themselves to "enforce" immigration law, motivated by
(1) personal views hostile to immigrants, (2) reactions to perceived
abuses of dependency court processes by immigrants, (3) suspicions
about their lawyers, or a combination of all three. With other
immigration policy challenges looming on the horizon for
immigrants, joining forces with other advocates and collaborating
with community groups seemed to me like an opportunity to engage
in a localized form of "rebellious lawyering." 201 Some of us saw the
threats and envisioned this type of strategy to meet other challenges
200 See, e.g., Katherine Porter, In the Best Interests of the INS: An Analysis of the 1997
Amendment to the Special Immigrant Juvenile Law, 27 J. LEGIS. 441, 448 (2001) (describing
how "a few cases of abuse of the SIJ statute in [the 1997 SIJS amendment sponsor's] state"
were the spur for tightened standards enacted by the resulting amendment); Kirk Semple,
Federal Scrutiny of a Youth Immigration Program Alarms Advocates, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/nyregion/federal-scrutiny-of-a-youth-immigration
-program-alarms-advocates. html?_r=0 (discussing reported instances of SIJS "abuses" by
Punjabi children filing petitions in New York family courts, prompting Congressional demands
for DHS investigations into the federal SIJ law).
201 See generally Bill Ong Hing, Contemplating a Rebellious Approach to Representing
Unaccompanied Immigrant Children in a Deportation Defense Clinic, 23 CLIN. L. REV.167, 203-
10 (2016) (describing rebellious immigrant advocacy strategies informed by client experiences,
animated by collaboration with community groups and other alliances, and taking on battles
"[e]ven if the [o]dds [s]eem [i]nsurmountable.").
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around the state, or even in the federal arena, to protect the interests
of immigrants. Advocacy for DACA recipients and DREAMers
prompted legal confrontation and debate on all sides.202 Community
organizing and advocacy were part of the mix. 2 0 3 After January 2017,
attention turned to policies inflicted by Trump on immigrant
children. 204  Inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric about
immigrants as rapists, human traffickers and drug dealers, endlessly
repeated in speeches, rallies, online conversations, and tweets, called
for concerted counterattacks and responses, including accurate and
factual information about who the undocumented immigrants in our
communities and states actually were.205
These larger considerations loomed over our comparatively small-
scale experience with Judge Colton, which involved just one
uninformed, xenophobic judge who engaged in egregious and
unlawful actions harmful to a few of the "illegal aliens" who had the
misfortune to appear in his court. But they also gave us a chance to
teach him, and potentially other judges, some basic points about his
obligation to protect-and to not jeopardize-the tenuous status of
immigrants who were appearing before him, so that, at the very least,
he would abide by confidentiality safeguards in Florida and federal
law. It was very obvious from what he did and said in these cases,
that he saw himself as a de facto immigration judge, serving the
interests of the U.S. Border Patrol, rather than as a juvenile court
judge, serving the best interests of the immigrant children who
appeared before him. Clearly, he needed to be told that his loyalties
were misplaced.
This lesson was an important opportunity to teach judges
throughout Florida about their "indispensable role in enabling
children to obtain SIJ status" and "their limited but vital role in
assisting undocumented immigrant youth."2 0 6 As the legal educator
202 See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 106, 115-16 (2014).
203 See Arelis R. Hernandez, What Will Happen to DACA? Federal Court Cases Could Lead
to an Answer, WASH. POsT (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/localmd-politics
/what-will-happen-to-daca-federal-court-cases-could-lead-to-an-answer/2018/08/19/95dc35f2-
9b30-1 1e8-843b-36e 177f3081c_story.html?utm term=.334619cdda76.
204 See Vivian Yee & Kirk Semple, Policy Under Trump Bars Obama-Era Path to U.S. for
Central American Youths, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us
/trump-central-american-refugees.html?mwrsm=Email&_r=0.
200 See, e.g., IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, WHO AND WHERE THE
DREAMERS ARE, REVISITED ESTIMATES 1 (2012).
206 See Theo Liebmann, Family Court and the Unique Needs of Children and Families Who
Lack Immigration Status, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 583, 588, 601 (2007) [hereinafter
Liebmann, Family Court].
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in this coalition, I too recognized this as a teaching moment. One way
to teach judges would be to prepare bench books, briefs, and
informational manuals about SIJS.20 7  Another way to elevate
practices in their courts on issues concerning undocumented
immigrants would be to conduct surveys of existing practices and
prepare reports and assessments, with informed recommendations
about improvements in the administration of justice. Law schools
and clinics frequently undertake these policy, court improvement,
and practice-oriented educational activities.208 Judges, lawyers, and
all of the ancillary dependency and family court professionals
involved in these cases need structured guidance and training to
better understand a child's or family's immigration status and how it
can influence the outcome of the proceedings, and law schools do this
work. 209
Enlisting fifteen organizations-law school clinics, children's
rights groups, immigration advocates, client groups and several
sections of the Florida bar-to sign on to the letter to "All Florida
Circuit Court Judges Assigned to Juvenile, Family, and Probate
Divisions" was a challenging but ultimately effective strategy.210 The
207 See, e.g., WENDI J. ADELSON, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS IN FLORIDA: A GUIDE
FOR JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND CHILD ADVOCATES 7 (2007), https://media.law.miami.edulclinics/ch
ildren-and-youth/pdfl2007/special-immigrant-juvenile-manual-2007.pdf; ANGIE JUNCK ET AL.,
SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS AND OTHER IMMIGRATION OPTIONS FOR CHILDREN &
YOUTH (5th ed. 2018); VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS FOR STATE COURT JUDGES 1 (2012); WASH. LEADERSHIP INST.,
WASHINGTON STATE COURT SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) BENCH BOOK AND
RESOURCE GUIDE 7 (2016), https://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/SIJSBenchbook.pdf.
208 See, e.g., FEERICK CTR. FOR SOC. JUSTICE, NEW YORK UNACCOMPANIED IMMIGRANT
CHILDREN PROJECT FAMiLY COURT WORKING GROUP: FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY OF LAWYERS
REPRESENTING IMMIGRANT YOUTH ELIGIBLE FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS IN NYS
FAMILY COURT 6-14 (2014), https://www.fordham.eduldownload/downloads/id/3019/findings
_from_a_surveyoflawyers representing-immigrant outh-eligiblejfor special-immigrant
juvenile-status-in-nys-family-court.pdf (recommending improvements in state court
handling of SIJS cases, strengthening access to competent counsel, and educating courts and
lawyers about the needs and vulnerabilities of immigrant communities).
209 See, e.g., David. B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences
of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL'Y 45, 72 (2005)
[hereinafter Thronson, OfBorders] ("[C]ourts and practitioners need to be alert to immigration
status and its role in proceedings. While immigration status often will be argued openly, such
issues and the family power dynamics that accompany them may not be obvious at first glance.
Courts must develop sensitivity and awareness to these issues, together with a willingness to
engage in them thoughtfully.").
210 See Memorandum from Florida Children's First, supra note 189, at 1, 10-11. Sign-on
letters, like amicus briefs (in which multiple organizations participate), are frequently used by
public interest advocates to present a policy or doctrinal position in which they share a common
interest. See, e.g., Sally Chaffin, Challenging the United States Position on a United Nations
Convention on Disability, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 121, 128 n.55 (2005) (coalition
letter to support congressional action to ensure human rights of persons with disabilities);
Michele A. Voss, Young and Marked for Death: Expanding the Definition of "Particular Social
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message that these organizations conveyed reflected their collective
authority and credibility as advocates for the rights of immigrants
and children, community-based client groups, and Florida bar
organizations. 211
Although we achieved this end without much of a fight from the
offending judge, we did not always agree about tactics. All of us
agreed that the judge's public anti-immigrant pronouncements and
other conduct compromised his integrity, independence and
impartiality as a member of the judiciary. Not all agreed that we
should lodge a Judicial Qualifications Commission complaint for
violating judicial canons. 212 One or two of us defended him as
basically a "good judge" who had lost his way. Others saw this
conduct and his public statements on and off the bench as markers of
a "bad judge" clearly irritated by having to preside over cases
involving aliens in his courtroom, obviously harboring animosity
toward them, and eager to scold them and cast them out of his
courtroom. 2 1 3 Some saw him as an "angry judge," unapologetically
Group" in Asylum Law to Include Youth Victims of Gang Persecution, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 235, 237
n.16 (2005) (AILA Sign-On Letter to DHS Secretary).
211 See Memorandum from Florida's Children First, supra note 189, at 1. Bringing together
organizations with expertise in different, and sometimes opposing, forms of advocacy (e.g.,
appellate advocacy vs. grassroots organizing) united around a common cause, is a
quintessential public interest lawyer's strategy-and challenge. See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless,
More than One Lane Wide: Against Hierarchies of Helping in Progressive Legal Advocacy, 19
CLINICAL L. REV. 347, 400 (2012) ("We should consider the ways in which collaborations of
different groups following different advocacy models, or a mix of more than one, can effectively
come together in common cause. . . . Such meta-strategies can take advantage of the talents
offered by each organization.").
212 Arguably, the judge's activities and public pronouncements violated provisions of
virtually all of the canons, including Canon 1 ("A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and
Independence of the Judiciary"); Canon 2 ("A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the
Appearance of Impropriety in all of the Judge's Activities"); Canon 3 ("A Judge Shall Perform
the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently"); Canon 5 ("A Judge Shall Regulate
Extrajudicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of Conflict With Judicial Duties"); and Canon 7
("A Judge or Candidate for Judicial Office Shall Refrain From Inappropriate Political Activity").
FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canons 1-3, 5, 7 (2018). As noted above, Judge Colton's
disinformation or misinformation about "our jurisprudence system and particularly the system
of law in the State of Florida" in his newspaper and O'Reilly interviews, were especially
egregious violations of his duty to abide by Canon 4, in that his activities to "improve" the law
and the administration of justice did just the opposite. See id. Canon 4 ("A Judge is Encouraged
to Engage in Activities to Improve the Law, the Legal System, and the Administration of
Justice").
213 Professor Geoffrey Miller, in his encyclopedic survey of "bad judges," cataloged many
varieties of inappropriate or "bad" judicial conduct and gave examples of each. See Geoffrey P.
Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 432 (2004). He described "judicial independence" as
the gold standard or hallmark of good judging: "[o]n the one hand, independence is itself a
quality enhancing policy. If judges are not independent, they will be subject to influence that
could distort the outcomes of cases, skew the development of substantive law, and detract from
public confidence in the judicial system." Id. at 456-57. Judge Colton's undisguised contempt
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irked at what he perceived to be an unwarranted invasion of his
courtroom by "illegal aliens" who had, in his view, no place there;
perhaps angry at the federal authorities for failing to capture these
illegal aliens and send them back to their home countries; angry at
Congress for foisting on the judge the responsibility of conducting
hearings to allow these children to avoid deportation and remain in
the U.S.; or angry at their unethical lawyers subverting the
dependency process to enable illegal immigrants to obtain legal
status in a dubious and illicit way, all of which was anathema to this
judge's personal political views. 2 1 4 For a variety reasons we reached
an impasse over the filing of a judicial misconduct complaint and did
not do so. 2 15
IV. GOOD (AND NOT So GOOD) JUDGEs BEHAVING BADLY
[I]t is apparent that ... the circuit court and this Court have
concluded that private petitions by immigrant juveniles are
generally appropriate for summary denial.
-Florida District Court of Appeal Judge Vance Salter 2 1 6
for illegal aliens influenced and distorted outcomes, compromised his judicial independence in
conducting hearings and deciding their individual cases, and in his efforts to use his judicial
office to facilitate their deportation rather than ensure their protection, degraded public
confidence in the judiciary.
One of the other broad categories of misconduct that he examined in depth, again quite
obviously relevant to this episode, involved displays on and off the bench of judicial "bias,
prejudice, and insensitivity" towards disfavored groups:
Bad judges display bias, prejudice, and stereotypical thinking. . . . They insult a melting
pot of groups including African Americans, Hispanics, Jews, Catholics, Italian-Americans,
English, Danes, Yugoslavians, Japanese, and otherwise-unidentified, undocumented
aliens. They look down on poor people, harbor animosity against homosexuals, and scold
or discriminate against women for being prostitutes, unwed mothers, welfare abusers, and
caregivers.
Id. at 445-47.
214 See, e.g., Maxine D. Goodman, Shame, Angry Judges, and the Social Media Effect, 63
CATH. U. L. REV. 589, 590 (2014) [hereinafter Goodman, Shame] ("As commentators begin to
wrestle with the issue of angry judges, the public and the legal community are calling for
greater transparency within the system of judicial discipline, hoping to stem the tide of judicial
misbehavior.").
215 Cf. Molly McDonough, Tenn. Judge Slapped for Harsh Treatment of Immigrant Juvies,
A.B.A. J. (May 19, 2008), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/tenn-judge-slapped-for
harsh treatmentofimmigrantjuviess (describing Tennessee Court of the Judiciary censure
of judge for conduct involving cases of children of undocumented immigrants and children he
perceived to be in U.S. illegally).
216 In re B.R.C.M. (B.R.C.M 1), 182 So. 3d 749, 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Salter, J.,
dissenting).
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As the Palm Beach County judicial controversy subsided, we had a
few years of peaceful coexistence with the judiciary in Florida, until
the unaccompanied child migrant flow from Central America ticked
up and more petitions started to be filed. Before the 2016 surge in
border apprehensions, judges had begun to see some new cases in the
courts, but there were, and still are, no hard statistics on the number
of new case filings. 217 Even though there was no hard data, there is
every reason to believe that the real numbers were exaggerated.
Anecdotal reports suggested an increase in filings, which in turn
provoked the reactionary response by judges. 218 Even though judges
may have seen some more Central American children's cases in their
courtrooms, their stated fears of an influx leading to an onslaught of
new filings in Miami-Dade County were probably overestimating the
magnitude and extent of the problem. 219
Nevertheless, at this point more judges, many of whom had
previously been sympathetic to the cases, began to push back. The
217 Chief Justice Labarga's dissenting opinion in O.I.C.L. II harvested the federal data about
the number of children released by ORR to sponsors in Florida, and combined it with
extrapolations about how many would likely opt to pursue SIJS relief, in order to make an
educated guess about the numbers of new Central American children's dependency court filings
in our state. See O.I.C.L. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (O.I.C.L. 11), 205 So. 3d 575, 580
(Fla. 2016) (Labarga, C.J., dissenting) ("In fiscal year 2015, an estimated 39,970
unaccompanied minors were apprehended at the border. Approximately 2,908 of those children
were released to sponsors in Florida. This number increased in fiscal year 2016, with
approximately 4,264 unaccompanied minors released to sponsors in Florida as of July 2016.
One of the common types of relief sought by these children is Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
(SIJS), which allows unaccompanied minors to apply for lawful permanent residency in the
United States.").
218 See Cleek, supra note 12 ("As more minors came before the court, judges began to
question, sometimes aggressively, why these immigrant kids were in their courtrooms at all
and deny these cases.").
2o Florida accounted for 148 SIJS applications-3.70--of the 3,994 applications filed
nationally with USCIS in 2013. See Laila L. Hlass, Minor Protections: Best Practices for
Representing Child Migrants, 47 N.M. L. REV. 247, 267, 289-90 (2017) [hereinafter Hlass,
Minor Protections]. And based on that percentage, the national number of USCIS approvals of
SIJS cases in 2017, as reported by the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics (4,681), would
signify approximately 173 total approvals for children in the entire state of Florida in that year.
See 2017 YEARBOOK: TABLE 7, supra note 153.
The unknown number, of course, was the cases that did not make it that far in the SIJS two-
tiered process, because they were summarily dismissed by judges. But even if five or fifty or
more cases had come into the Miami-Dade Children's Court during the relevant period, it is
hard to see how this or even a higher estimated volume of cases would have burdened or
overwhelmed the court and the judges assigned to hear dependency, delinquency and unified
family court cases. See David Ovalle, Miami-Dade's New Children's Courthouse Called 'Place
of Hope,' MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community
/miami-dade/downtown-miamilarticlel9365378.htm1 ("Hundreds of civic leaders and the
biggest names in the legal community gathered on Friday to celebrate the opening of Miami-
Dade's Children's Courthouse-a gleaming modern building featuring 18 courtrooms and bear
sculptures in the lobby to greet visitors.").
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undocumented immigrant children were now forced to navigate a
complex and increasingly more hostile court system, more than what
they had previously experienced. 220 Latin American and Caribbean
children with unauthorized status suffer more severe family stress
and instability, have poorer health outcomes and less educational
attainment, and experience greater social isolation than other "legal"
and U.S.-citizen children.221 Excluding children without legal status
from Florida's dependency courts, and thus preventing them from
acquiring SIJS, could be considered a form of "silencing" that
exacerbates stressors and increases social isolation. 222
The shift in judicial responses to private petitions filed by these
children was dramatic. In just a few years, judges' attitudes changed
from being receptive to the petitions to summarily dismissing
them. 2 2 3 Immigrant children's lawyers saw claims of abuse or neglect
being completely disregarded, in much more dismissive ways than
they had experienced in prior years. 224 Not every judge was openly
220 See Keyes, supra note 10, at 36 ("Immigration litigation is always difficult, but the
children's cases raise a host of special challenges: not only are these minors with varying
degrees of capacity and legal competence, but a sizable portion have suffered terrible traumas
that may make it hard to build a case.").
221 See Jorge M. Chavez et al., Sufren Los Niilos: Exploring the Impact of Unauthorized
Immigration Status on Children's Well-Being, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 638, 640, 642-45 (2012).
222 See, e.g., Evelyn H. Cruz, Validation Through Other Means: How Immigration Clinics
Can Give Immigrants a Voice When Bureaucracy Has Left Them Speechless, 17 ST. THOMAs L.
REV. 811, 812-13 (2005).
223 Judge Salter's B.R.C.M. I dissent traced the trajectory of these changes in Florida,
finding routine grants of dependency petitions at the outset and summary denials in later
years:
Florida appellate cases reported from 2005 to 2011 were receptive to immigrant juveniles
petitioning for dependency.
From the elaboration of rulings in 2015 in this district . . ., it is apparent that . .. the
circuit court and this Court have concluded that private petitions by immigrant juveniles
are generally appropriate for summary denial, despite the more deliberate consideration
previously afforded the SIJ petitioners in [a circuit court case in] 2013 . . . and in prior
opinions by the district courts of appeal.
In re B.R.C.M. (B.R.C.M. I.), 182 So. 3d at 756, 763 (Salter, J., dissenting).
224 See, e.g., Shani M. King, Alone and Unrepresented: A Call to Congress to Provide Counsel
for Unaccompanied Minors, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331, 342 (2013) ("Perhaps the biggest
obstacle that the lawyer had to overcome was convincing DHS, the dependency judge, and the
immigration officer that [unaccompanied alien child] Catherine's story was credible. . . .");
Christopher Nugent, Whose Children Are These? Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and
Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 227 (2006) ("While
unaccompanied children's cases are more exacting and more difficult to prepare by virtue of the
child's development, sometimes DHS resistance and skepticism often makes representing
children even more challenging, time-consuming and expensive than representing adults.
Individual cases can easily become polarizing and politicized.").
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hostile to immigrants, but a child's immigration status undoubtedly
influenced bad rulings in these cases.225 The ominous if inaccurate
warnings of floods of children entering the U.S. was not a sentiment
or fear isolated to Florida judges. 226  Nor were the novel
interpretations of state and federal laws limiting access to SIJS at
the dependency court phase unique to Florida courts. 227 But the
events in Florida were more systemic and pervasive in their barely
disguised fears of the massive influx from the Northern Triangle and
its impact on the courts.
There was an anti-immigrant unworthiness or illegality subtext to
the reasoning in many of these opinions. 228 It struck at their
identities as immigrant children, deemed unworthy of having their
day in court. 229 As Professor David Thronson has observed: "[j]udges
225 See Thronson, OfBorders, supra note 209, at 71-72 ("[T]he patterns that emerge from
reviewing family court decisions indicate that the impact of immigration status in family court
is not an irregular occurrence. Whether family courts are discriminating, manipulating,
obfuscating or accommodating, immigration status influences, sometimes determinatively, the
outcome of cases.").
226 See, e.g., In re Luis G., 764 N.W.2d 648, 653 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009) ("Both [the juveniles'
attorney] and [the attorney representing DHHS] argued persuasively it is in the best interests
of the juveniles that they remain in this country. The Court is convinced that is true. However,
the Court is equally convinced there are, in all probability, tens if not hundreds of thousands
of people who are here illegally or who would like to come to the United States because they
would be better off in this country.").
227 See, e.g., In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 641-42, 644-45, 648 (Neb. 2012) (interpreting
"1 or both parents" language of 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J), as amended by the 2008 TVPRA
amendment, to disallow the entry of a best interest order for a child, based on a juvenile court's
finding that the child could be reunified with his mother, which barred entry of the order);
Canales v. Orellana, 800 S.E.2d 208, 217-18 (Va. Ct. App. 2017) (en banc) ("[Best interest]
orders should have been generated by state courts applying state law in the normal course of
their responsibilities under the laws of the respective states. Nothing in the INA directs a state
court to do anything more than carry out its adjudicatory responsibilities under state law.").
These two decisions have spurred critical commentary for departing from the intent of Congress
and pertinent state laws, reflecting concerns about disparate results in the SIJS two-tiered
process in different states. See, e.g., In Case of First Impression, Virginia Court of Appeals
Holds that State's Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts and Circuit Courts Lack Jurisdiction
to Make Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Findings of Fact, 94 no. 27 Interpreter Releases
(West) Art. 13 (July 7, 2017) (discussing Canales v. Orellana); Kristen Jackson, Special Status
Seekers: Through the Underused SIJS Process, Immigrant Juveniles May Obtain Legal Status,
34 L.A. LAW. 20, 23 (2012) (discussing Erick M.); Heryka Knoespel, Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status: A "Juvenile" Here Is Not a "Juvenile" There, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST.
505, 510 (2013) (discussing Erick M); Priya Konings, An Advocate's Guide to Protecting
Unaccompanied Minors, 31 CHILD L. PRAC. June 2012, at 81, 86 (discussing Erick M.); Randi
Mandelbaum & Elissa Steglich, Disparate Outcomes: The Quest for Uniform Treatment of
Immigrant Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV., 606, 613 n.56 (2012) (discussing Erick M.). See also
Richard F. Storrow, Unaccompanied Minors at the U.S.-Mexico Border: The Shifting Sands of
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 20-29 (2018) (mapping across
several jurisdictions different forms of state court "resistance" to the SIJS requirements, "some
more benign than others").
228 See Thronson, OfBorders, supra note 209, at 54-55.
229 See id. at 55.
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who discriminate on the basis of immigration status reflect
acceptance, consciously or otherwise, of a pervasive societal narrative
that constructs an expanding notion of unworthiness and 'illegality'
regarding undocumented immigrants and a diminished popular
sense regarding the availability of protection from prejudice and
discrimination." 230
V. A GOOD JUDGE ASKING HARD QUESTIONS
Do these 'Private Petitions'present a "case or controversy"
appropriate for judicial determination?
-Florida Circuit Judge Michael Hanzman 23 1
Years before B.R.C.M. II, some dependency judges, concerned
about the influx of new cases from Central American children, began
to ask questions about "the legitimacy of these cases." 2 32 Perhaps the
most provocative and difficult questions about the legitimacy of
private petitions filed on behalf of immigrant children were asked by
Judge Michael Hanzman, who presided in the Juvenile Division of
the Miami-Dade Circuit Court from 2011 to 2016.233 Judge Hanzman
was appointed to the bench by Rick Scott, Florida's conservative
Republican governor, to fill a judicial vacancy in 2011, and won
election in 2012.234 As a former civil litigator, with twenty-five years
of experience handling class actions and other types of complex
litigation in federal and state courts, 235 he brought sophisticated trial
lawyer skills and experience to the juvenile bench. He gained a
reputation as an activist judge known for asking tough questions of
lawyers, child welfare agency administrators and staff, and other
participants in the dependency court, to make sure that children
230 Id. at 54-55.
231 Order Requiring Briefing & Scheduling Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 6.
232 See In re M.A.S.-Q. & Y.E.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 213a (11th Cir. Ct. Oct. 22,
2013).
233 See Carlos Harrison, From Beginning, Judge Hanzman Targeted the Courtroom, DAILY
BUS. REV. (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.law.comldailybusinessreview/almlD/1202740574 9 9 3
/from-beginning-judge-hanzman-targeted-the-courtroom/; see also Complex Business Kerfuffle,
JUST. BUILDING BLOG (Nov. 14, 2016), http://justicebuilding.blogspot.com/2016/11/complex-
business-kerfuffle.html (Judge Hanzman transferred from juvenile dependency court to
criminal court at the end of 2016).
234 See Governor Scott Appoints Michael A. Hanzman to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court,
FLA. GOVERNOR (May 23, 2011), http://www.flgov.com/2011/05/23/governor-scott-appoints-
michael-a-hanzman-to-the-eleventh-judicial-circuit-court/; Michael A. Hanzman,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org[MichaelA._Hanzman (last visited Mar. 31, 2019); Rick
Scott, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/RickScott (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
235 See Harrison, supra note 233.
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were safe, secure and getting necessary treatment and services while
under his watch. 2 36
Our clinic participated in several of these cases, which Judge
Hanzman conducted very much like a skilled trial attorney,
aggressively posing questions to parties, participants and agency
representatives that he subpoenaed to appear before him, all in an
effort to investigate harmful practices toward children that he
encountered in his daily docket. 237 When these hearings concluded,
he issued orders with detailed findings and sophisticated analysis
that allowed him to craft broad, systemic remedies for the children
affected. He also frequently enlisted the media to cover these
hearings and he shared with his colleagues on the bench the well-
written and carefully-reasoned orders that he issued after the
hearings. 238
Judge Hanzman is generally credited with (or blamed for)
initiating the wave of judicial rulings from trial and appellate courts
that ultimately resulted in viewing the petitions as appropriate for
summary denial. 239 He began with one case, In re M.A.S-Q. & YE.S-
Q., involving two children from Guatemala, siblings who had been
apprehended by federal agents and placed in the custody of ORR. 2 4 0
The children were represented by an immigration lawyer with a
236 See id.
237 The judge's activist posture in the dependency court proceedings over which he conducted
his own investigations of wrongdoing by agencies runs counter to the generally accepted
practice of judges relying on court-appointed advocates such as guardians and particularly
attorneys to do this investigative monitoring and advocacy. See, e.g., Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356
F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2005) ("Judges, unlike child advocate attorneys, cannot
conduct their own investigations and are entirely dependent on others to provide them
information about the child's circumstances.").
23 See, e.g., Carol Marbin Miller, DCF Gets a Grilling from Judges over 4-Year-Old's Care,
MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/articlel954287.html ("At Tuesday's hearing, Hanzman challenged the agency to 'give me
an argument or a rationale for looking at this set of facts where you leave a 4-year-old home in
the circumstances of this case?'); see also Carol Marbin Miller, Under Fire from Judge, DCF
Provides Treatment for Troubled Siblings, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 28, 2015), http://
www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article8528555.html ('Miami-Dade Circuit Judge
Michael Hanzman chided lawyers and administrators at both DCF and the Agency for Health
Care Administration-which runs the state Medicaid program for needy Floridians, and is
responsible, at least indirectly, for securing treatment beds-for making children like the
siblings wait for necessary care."); David Ovalle, Miami Foster Group Home Under Scrutiny for
Video ofKids Fighting, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local
/community/miami-dade/article54125210.html ("In extraordinarily blunt language, the judge
blasted Children's Home Society of Florida, a statewide company that runs 11 foster homes in
Miami-Dade.").
239 See In re B.R.C.M. (B.R.C.M 1), 182 So. 3d 749, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Salter, J.,
dissenting), rev'd sub nom. B.R.C.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (B.R.C.M. II), 215 So.
3d 1219 (Fla. 2017).
240 In re M.A.S.-Q & Y.E.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 213a (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2013).
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private practice in Miami, who was later substituted by the FIU
clinic.241 At least one of the parents was appointed legal counsel
through the state-funded Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil
Regional Counsel, and counsel for DCF and the Guardian ad Litem
("GAL") Program also participated in the litigation.242
Eventually, other organizations (including our clinic) participated
in a friend-of-the-court capacity, at the invitation of the judge. My
students and I prepared an amicus brief on behalf of these
organizations, describing our shared interests in the litigation as
advocating "to protect and promote the basic human rights of
immigrants through a unique combination of free direct services,
impact litigation, policy reform, and public education at local, state
and national levels."2 43
The judge was clearly puzzled about how to address the facts
alleged in the children's petition as they were framed by the
immigration lawyer who prepared the petition. He wanted answers
to various procedural and doctrinal questions implicated by the legal
theories that the child's counsel put forward to support the
dependency. This prompted him to ask for further briefing by the
parties (the child's counsel, DCF, GAL, and the parents' attorneys)
along with an open invitation that he tendered to "[c]haritable
organizations, Legal Aid Societies, or private counsel involved in
these cases . . . ."244
This was not his first case involving an undocumented immigrant
child in his docket seeking an adjudication of dependency and a SIJS
best interest order. In his unusual, open invitation soliciting input
from non-parties about the law, Hanzman was blunt about his
growing discomfort with "these cases." 2 4 5 He laid out concerns about
the particulars of this one case, but he also wanted answers to more
general questions presented in the cases of "many" other alien
241 Id. The FIU clinic provides students opportunities to "represent children in court seeking
to have them declared dependent in juvenile court so they can then apply for special immigrant
juvenile status or asylum." Isabel Gamarra, FIU Students Help Newly Arrived Immigrant
Children, FIU NEWS (Oct. 1, 2014), https://news.flu.edul2014/10/fiu-students-help-newly-arrive
d-immigrant-children/81581. The clinic handles complex SIJS-related dependency and family
court cases and has been involved in several significant Florida SIJS appellate cases. See, e.g.,
In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); B.R.C.M. II, 215 So. 3d 1219; B.R.C.M
I, 182 So. 3d 749.
242 See In re M.A.S-Q. & YE.S-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 213a.
243 Id.; Brief of Americans for Immigrant Justice et al. as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner at 2,
In re MA.S.-Q & YE.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 213a (No. 13-15672 D09) (on file with
author).
244 Order Requiring Briefing and Scheduling of Oral Argument at 6, 7, 22 Fla. L. Weekly
Supp. 213a (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2013).
245 Id. at 1.
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children over which he had presided. He did not enumerate how
many other cases like this one had been filed in his court.
The judge crystallized his concerns in the opening paragraphs of
his request for briefing. He expressed uncertainty about his
jurisdiction to adjudicate the extraterritorial abuse and
maltreatment occurring years earlier in two different Central
American countries, and the particularly the temporal remoteness as
applied to the dependency allegations raised in the litigation years
later by these 16 and 17 year olds:
This case is one of many initiated by a "Private Petition for
Dependency" filed on behalf of alien children who: (a) entered
the country illegally, and (b) are in the custody of the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). These
petitions typically are filed by pro-bono counsel recruited by
Legal Aid or charitable organizations and, with few
exceptions, are brought on the eve of the child's eighteenth
(1 8 th) birthday.
In the vast majority of these cases it is alleged that the subject
child was abused, abandoned or neglected in their home
country - usually years prior to filing.2 4 6
The judge asked whether the facts of this case, which alleged prior
abuse by their father and stepfather in El Salvador and Guatemala,
and abandonment by the stepfather, in addition to substantial risk of
imminent abuse or abandonment if forced to return to El Salvador or
Guatemala qualified for an adjudication of dependency. 247 The
dependency petition sought the court's "protect[ion] . . . from further
abuse, abandonment or neglect[,] to allow [the two siblings] to remain
safely in the [U.S.]" 2 4 8 There were also allegations of sexual abuse by
a family member and severe neglect.249 The petition contended that
they were dependent pursuant to two of the statutes at issue in
B.R.C.M., section 39.01(15)(a), defining a "dependent child" as one
found by the court "[t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected
by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians[,]" and section
39.01(15)(f), defining a dependent child as one who is at "substantial
risk of imminent abuse, abandonment or neglect," which in this case
referred to the risks that the children faced if returned to their
246 Id.
247 See id. at 2-3.
248 Id. at 3.
249 See id. at 2, 3.
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homelands.250
These facts, and the supporting legal argument in the children's
petition, prompted Judge Hanzman to ask for briefing first on this
question: "Can a Chapter 39 Dependency case be based upon alleged
abuse, abandonment or neglect occurring wholly outside the United
States? If so, can it [be] based upon alleged abuse occurring years
prior to the filing of the Petition?" 251 Secondly, the judge was also
troubled by whether the children's parents' "consents" to the petition
would support an adjudication of the dependency. 252 The mother was
uncharged in the petition but she nevertheless gave "express"
consent to allegations directed at the children's father. 253  The
father's consent was "implied" by his failure to respond to the
petition, which was served upon him constructively through a
diligent search completed prior to adjudication, and an affidavit of
diligent search filed and reviewed by the court. 254
But this case also instigated broader systemic questions from the
judge about how "'private petitions' filed on behalf of alien minors ...
typically not prompted by an 'abuse' report," and other irregularities
or departures from normal dependency practice. 255 Judge Hanzman
had previously adjudicated the children dependent and he was now
sua sponte asking for briefing to revisit the prior issued adjudicatory
order.256
In addition to the questions of extraterritorial abuse and parental
consent, Judge Hanzman asked more general questions about
whether the petition should be granted in view of the children's
failure to ask for any child welfare services from DCF, observing-
with some sarcasm-that "it appears that there is no purpose served
by this proceeding and that the Court is nothing more than a paper
tiger 'presiding' over a fictional 'case."'2 5 7 He provocatively asked
whether the "[c]hildren are - or ever were - 'dependent' on the State,
250 FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15) (2019); see Order Requiring Briefing and Scheduling of Oral
Argument, supra note 244, at 2.
251 Order Requiring Briefing and Scheduling of Oral Argument, supra note 244, at 6.
252 See id.
253 See id. at 3.
254 See In re M.A.S.-Q & Y.E.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 213a (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2013); see also
FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1) (2018) ("Unless parental rights have been terminated, all parents must
be notified of all proceedings or hearings involving the child."); FLA. R. JuV. P. 8.225(b)
(describing the requirements and procedures for a diligent search to locate a parent in
dependency cases); In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187, 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (remanding for
further proceedings to determine whether a diligent search as required by law was conducted).
255 In re M.A.S.-Q & YE.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 213a.
256 See Order Requiring Briefing and Scheduling of Oral Argument, supra note 244, at 3-4,
6.
257 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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as they are not seeking any services and do not appear to require any
protection from this Court." 25 8 He reduced the gravamen of their case
to a mere request for "the Court's 'assistance' in immigration
matters," not any of the expected child welfare needs typically
presented in a dependency action filed in state court.25 9 And perhaps
most provocatively, he questioned whether the "scarce" resources of
the dependency court "should be devoted to cases involving children
and families who are truly 'dependent' on the State; not children
whose needs are being met by the federal government, and who seek
a 'dependency' adjudication and 'best interest order' solely for
purposes of securing preferential immigration treatment." 260 Many
of these concerns echoed those voiced by the Palm Beach County
judge years earlier and they prefigured objections made by
subsequent trial and appellate judges.
The judge was also perplexed by the interplay and perceived
conflicts between the federal and state governments undermining his
judicial authority vis-A-vis these children. 261 His analysis anticipated
Justice Canady's B.R.C.M. II dissent.262 ORR, as he saw it, had
"custody" of the children after their apprehension by DHS and
transfer to ORR, and it had placed them with their mother, in
disregard of the judge's prior custody orders. 263 Conflicts over his
judicial authority to oversee the children's care, safety and
protection, and the federal government's exercise of its powers with
respect to the children's placement, were a source of frustration-and
confusion-to the court. But this should not have detracted from his
appraisal of the legal sufficiency of the allegations in the children's
petition.264
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 See id. at 4-5.
262 Compare id. at 7 ("How are alien children in the legal custody of HHS, which has 'placed'
them with a parent it deemed adequate to provide care, 'dependent' on the State of Florida?"),
with B.R.C.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (B.R.C.M. II), 215 So. 3d 1219, 1226 (Fla.
2017) (Canady, J., dissenting) ("[Tihere is no allegation of any deficiency on the part of the
caregiver-B.R.C.M.'s godmother-to whom B.R.C.M. has been entrusted by the federal
government. Indeed, B.R.C.M. seeks to remain in the custody of the caregiver.").
263 See Order Requiring Briefing and Scheduling of Oral Argument, supra note 244, at 2, 4
("The Court also ordered that a representative from ORR be present 'to show cause why the
children were placed with the Mother without approval from this Court, in violation of its
Order."').
264 Federal government authority to place apprehended alien children with parents and
other caregivers derives from statutory sources, see 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1) (2012), and the
settlement of a nationwide federal class action lawsuit, see Stipulated Settlement Agreement,
Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997). The judge's concern about
the limits of his jurisdiction over the children in this case, based on his frustration that he had
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Judge Hanzman questioned the "collusive" nature of the hearings
(the "consents" to dependency offered by the parents) and asked
whether "private petitions" present a justiciable "case or controversy"
when they are uncontested by parents and the state offers no position
on the merits or legal sufficiency of the petition.265 He asked for
guidance on whether the court had properly adjudicated these
children based on the parents' consents (express consent by the
mother and implied consent by the father). 266 He asked for briefing
on whether the U.S. Attorney General was required to consent to the
court's jurisdiction, as the children were in federal custody. 267 And,
as noted, he wanted briefing on whether the court could adjudicate a
child dependent based on acts that occurred years earlier in a foreign
jurisdiction.268
no sway over the conflicting ORR decision to place them with the mother, as required by Flores,
no doubt caused him to view the private petition filed by the children as just a vehicle to use
his court to obtain immigration relief and not protection from parental abuse or neglect from
the court.
Conflicts between federal and state governments with respect to the immigration rights of
children under the jurisdiction of state courts are subsumed under Supremacy Clause doctrine,
elevating federal rights over state law. See, e.g., Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981)
(first citing McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S.
572, 581 (1979); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890); and then citing McCarty, 453 U.S.
at 236-37; Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 590; Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962); Wissner v.
Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 659 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382, 389-90 (1905))
("Notwithstanding the limited application of federal law in the field of domestic relations
generally, this Court, even in that area, has not hesitated to protect, under the Supremacy
Clause, rights and expectancies established by federal law against the operation of state law,
or to prevent the frustration and erosion of the congressional policy embodied in the federal
rights."). ORR's disregard of his custody orders was no doubt one reason the judge saw the case
as really "about" immigration rather than child protection. Of course, the children did not have
any say in their placement with their mother by ORR which rendered this placement decision,
rightly or wrongly, on its own.
Dependency courts are vested with parens patriae responsibilities "[tlo provide for the care,
safety, and protection of children in an environment that fosters healthy social, emotional,
intellectual, and physical development; to ensure secure and safe custody," FLA. STAT. §
39.001(1)(a) (2019), and Hanzman had every reason to be frustrated by ORR, which had much
less competency to assess the children's needs than he had as a circuit court judge, see, for
example, Chen, Elian or Alien?, supra note 155, at 611 ('The federal government's more limited
regulatory role in child welfare has resulted in comparatively less operational capacity in
dealing with individual child welfare cases.... As a result, state courts have developed greater
competency for administration of child welfare matters.").
265 In re M.A.S.-Q & Y.E.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 213a (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2013) (citing In
re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187, 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)).
266 See In re M.A.S.-Q & YE.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 213a; Order Requiring
Briefing and Scheduling of Oral Argument, supra note 244, at 6.
267 See In re M.A.S.-Q & YE.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 213a (first citing P.G. v. Dep't
of Children & Family Servs., 867 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); then citing F.L.M. v.
Dep't of Children & Families, 912 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); and then citing M.B.
v. Quarantillo, 301 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2002)).
268 See In re MA.S.-Q & YE.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 213a; Order Requiring
Briefing and Scheduling of Oral Argument, supra note 244, at 6.3e.
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Judge Hanzman used this as a "test case" to examine his own
evolving skeptical views on the merits of immigrant children's
private petitions. Typically, a test case like this is filed by a civil
rights or plaintiffs lawyer, and it is not initiated or litigated by the
judge, although there are instances of judges fashioning broad
remedies to effectuate broader policy reform that may go outside of
the parameters of a complaint. 269 Judge Hanzman performed a role
beyond mere fact-finder and adjudicator. He aggressively prosecuted
the case to frame policy that would guide him and other judges in
alien children's cases. The judge appeared to genuinely want to
understand "the nature of these cases; the interests at stake; the
interplay between Federal and State law as it relates to the rights
and needs of alien minors; the Court's designated role in addressing
these petitions; and the impact the Court's decisions can have on the
lives of these immigrant youth." 2 7 0
Ultimately, most of Judge Hanzman's questions were answered
and his concerns were assuaged. His carefully reasoned fourteen-
page, single-spaced ruling was quoted at length in Judge Salter's
B.R.C.M. I dissent. 271  Judge Hanzman's judicial posture was
consistent with the activism that he displayed throughout his time in
Miami-Dade Children's Court. He was ambitious and perhaps
arrogant in dictating systems-reform edicts from the bench, but I do
not think he was motivated by anti-immigrant impulses. Although
he expressed "[d]oubt as to the legitimacy of these cases," 2 72 I do not
think that he was a "bad judge" as I describe that term in this Article.
He was a good judge asking hard questions. 273 Although his efforts
to import his considerable analytical skills into this process were
unusual for a judge sitting in dependency court,274 other judges did
269 See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family
Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 919, 920 (1986) (reviewing ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., IN THE
INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985)) ("[The book]
investigates the role of the judge not just in deciding cases, but in writing policy.").
270 In re MA.S.-Q. & Y.E.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 213a.
271 See In re B.R.C.M. (B.R.C.M 1), 182 So. 3d 749, 757 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Salter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting In re M.A.S.-Q. & Y.E.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 213a), rev'd sub
nom. B.R.C.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (B.R.C.M. 11), 215 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2017).
272 In re M.A.S.-Q. & Y.E.S.-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 213a.
273 He responded to our joint amicus brief and arguments in the court hearing with much
interest and gratitude, quoting several passages from it in his order. See id. at n.2 ("The Court
appreciates their assistance and commends them on the quality of their jointly filed Amicus
Curiae brief."). Our students found the work of preparing the amicus and participating in the
hearings to be a capstone of their law school and clinic experiences.
274 See, e.g., Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile Court
Judge, 43 JUv. & FAM. CT. J., no. 2, 1992, at 33, 34-35 ("One of the greatest challenges facing
the juvenile court is attracting competent jurists to serve as juvenile court judges.. . . The
1604 [Vol. 82.4
Judges Behaving Badly
not display the intellectual curiosity or jurisprudential rigor in the
immigrant children's cases that they heard and decided.
VI. JUDGES ANSWERING GOOD QUESTIONS BADLY AND NOT ASKING
QUESTIONS
We correctly decline to subordinate ourselves to the whim of the
United States Congress in this case. The purpose of the
dependency laws of this state is to protect and serve children
and families in need, not those with a different agenda.
-Florida District Court of Appeal Judge Frank Shepherd 275
A. Judges Answering Questions Badly
Two years after M.A.S.-Q. and YE.S.-Q., Judge Hanzman revisited
his concerns. This time he had a private petition case of a Central
American child abandoned by his mother years earlier and now living
with his "uncharged" father. 276 The petition also alleged that the
child had been threatened by gangs in his home country, which the
judge concluded would "not support a dependency adjudication
unless perhaps a parent's failure to protect a child from such abuse
rises to the level of 'neglect."' 2 7 7 The judge denied the petition without
prejudice, finding the abandonment too remote ("long stale"), and not
connected to any imminent or continuing risk of harm.2 7 8
In rendering his ruling, Hanzman considered dependency only
under section 39.01(15)(a) (abandonment, abuse, or neglect by the
child's parent, parents, or legal custodian). 279 The child was residing
with his uncharged father, and the allegations of abuse,
abandonment or neglect as to the mother were found to be too remote
in time to support dependency. 280 In evaluating the legal sufficiency
of the abandonment claim, he inserted a "harm" requirement into his
juvenile court is perceived of as a social and not a legal court . . . .").
275 In re K.B.L.V., 176 So. 3d 297, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Shepherd, J., specially
concurring).
276 In re E.G.S.-H, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 693b (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2015).
277 Id. at n.1. The child was represented by a non-dependency practitioner from Miami. In
my years of handling and observing SIJS cases in the Miami juvenile court, I noticed
practitioners, including immigration lawyers with less sophisticated knowledge of dependency
law, submit petitions with facts not always germane to chapter 39, many better suited for
political asylum petitions.
278 See id. at 693b.
279 See id.
280 See id.
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analysis. 2 81 He also criticized the "long stale" abandonment by the
mother as urging overly "literal" reading of chapter 39.282 He warned
of an "unreasonable and ridiculous result[]" from reading the
dependency statute to "permit[] a child to be adjudicated dependent
so long as they have ever been abused, abandoned or neglected by
any parent or legal custodian at any time, and regardless of whether
the child continues to be at any risk of harm."2 8 3
Judge Hanzman's cramped statutory analysis was problematic for
several reasons. First, as noted, he conflated the statute's abuse and
abandonment definitions, adding "harm" into the abandonment
definition.2 84 Requiring proof of independent harm might reward the
passive actions of abandoning parents over the active actions of
abusive parents. Such a requirement could allow a parent to argue
as a defense to the petition that the child they abandoned was not
"truly" harmed by that abandonment because the custodial parent
continued to provide for the child's care. And the harm requirement
might incentivize loving caretakers of children-both immigrant and
non-immigrant-to withdraw their support in order to prove that the
offending parent's abandonment was sufficiently harmful to the
child.285
The court's temporal remoteness point would allow the parent of
281 Id. (quoting In re M.A.S-Q. & Y.E.S-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 213a (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2013)).
282 In re E.G.S.-H., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 693b.
283 Id.
284 See id. (quoting In re M.A.S-Q. & Y.E.S-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 213a). The Order
Denying Petition for Adjudication of Dependency cited to inapposite abuse dependency law, for
example, B.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 846 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003),
for the proposition that "instances of domestic violence in the presence of the child occurring
more than a year and a half prior to filing were 'simply too remote in time to support an
adjudication of dependency."' In re E.G.S.-H., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 693b (quoting B.C.,
846 So. 2d at 1275).
Undercutting Hanzman's misplaced reliance on inapposite, time-barred abuse or domestic
violence case law, Florida dependency actions are often based on allegations of abandonment
that began years earlier. See V.C.B. v. Shakir, 145 So. 3d 967, 968, 968 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014) (upholding dependency where children had been abandoned by father 5 years earlier);
L.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 71 So. 3d 221, 222, 223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(upholding order of dependency when children had not seen their mother for more than 3 years
and 9 month months). In fact, the very nature of abandonment requires that it be at least some
time removed from the filing of the petition of dependency and be ongoing. Florida law thus
properly contemplates that abandonment must be continuing. "[A]bandonment" is defined as
the "failfure] to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child,"
including "frequent and regular contact with the child through frequent and regular visitation
or frequent and regular communication." FLA. STAT. § 39.01(1) (2019) (emphasis added); see
also § 39.806(1)(e) (providing for the termination of parental rights based on allegations that
the child "continues to be ... abandoned").
285 See, e.g., In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187, 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) ("A summary denial,
on the other hand, might incent T.J.'s aunt to truly 'abandon' T.J. at a police station or
Department office in a misguided effort to obtain a dependency ruling.").
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any child in Florida-immigrant or non-immigrant-abandoned by
the parent at birth and then years later subjected to abuse or neglect
by the custodial parent, to frustrate a dependency petition for a child
in whose life the parent had next to zero involvement. 286 These
consequences, which were not considered by Hanzman in his order,
undermined the purposes of chapter 39 and, if adopted by a higher
court, would narrow DCF grounds to petition courts for protection in
citizen children's cases.
Lastly, because E.G.S.-H. was residing with his uncharged father,
and the allegations of abandonment, abuse, and neglect as to the
mother were found to be too remote in time, the petitioner and
counsel or the court may not have focused on the single-parent
finding of dependency for SIJ purposes. 287 Florida Statute section
39.01(15)(a) allows for a finding that a child is dependent even when
allegations are made against one parent-and the statutory
definition of "abandonment" speaks to the actions of a singular
parent, using the terms "the parent" or "a parent." 288 The definition
includes situations where the child may still be receiving care from
another parent or caregiver, such as when the abandoning parent
"fail[s] to establish or maintain a substantial and positive
relationship with the child[.]" 2 8 9 Dependencies are appropriate under
section 39.01(15)(a) even where a child has "locatable, living parents"
and a responsible loving adult is caring for the child. 290 What matters
is whether the child has met the statutory definition for a dependency
adjudication as to either parent.
B. Judges Not Asking Questions
Another result of In re E.G.S.-H was that it started to influence
other circuit court judges in the Miami-Dade Children's Court. Judge
286 On its face, the statute requires a finding of dependency for a child who is "abandoned,
abused or neglected," regardless of when that child was abandoned, abused or neglected.
Indeed, the provision does not even require the child to be at imminent risk. In re Y.V., 160 So.
3d 576, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting § 39.01(15)(f)) ("[S]etting forth a separate ground
for dependency when the child is at 'substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or
neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians."') (emphasis added).
287 Compare In re E.G.S.-H., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 693b ('Mother's alleged
abandonment was realized [many] years ago and the child . .. now resides ... with his
uncharged Father [and] is at no risk of abuse, abandonment or neglect."), with H.S.P. v. J.K.,
121 A.3d 849, 852 (N.J. 2015) (examining the "1 or both" parents language of the SIJ statute to
support a New Jersey family court one-parent adjudication for the purpose of making the
necessary best interest findings to declare a child eligible for SIJS).
288 FIA. STAT. § 39.01(1), (15)(a).
289 FIA. STAT. § 39.01(1).
290 In re Y. V., 160 So. 3d at 579.
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Hanzman's ruling, language, and reasoning made their way into
family court custody rulings and percolated into appellate court
opinions.291 Judge Hanzman also submitted it and the earlier order
to the Florida Law Weekly Supplement for publication. 292 Once the
judge shared his "case law" with the juvenile dependency court bench,
they began to rely on it and use it. The other judges apparently saw
Judge Hanzman's ruling as giving them permission to stop
conducting hearings over any immigrant children's private
petitions. 293 A group-think mindset began to emerge. Judges issued
dismissals without hearing evidence, asking questions, or performing
expected judicial roles of engaging in fact-finding or legal analysis. 294
At one point, each judge had a stack of Hanzman's orders on their
bench, and asked their clerk or judicial assistant to fill in by hand the
case number, name of child, and date of hearing of each case
dismissed at the end of the short, meaningless hearings. 295
The result of petitions dismissed en masse by judges in the Miami-
Dade dependency court was that children born in other countries
stopped getting any form of due process or protection from the court
no matter what facts their petitions alleged or what relief they sought
from the court.296 I observed immigrant children's lawyers leave
courtrooms with their clients, moments after entering, stunned by
the resistance they encountered in the courtrooms after their short,
unsuccessful appearances before the judges. There is no doubt that
the effects of the published but non-binding order in In re E.G.S.-H
influenced other judges' lack of interest in these cases.297
291 See, e.g., In re B.R.C.M. (B.R.C.M 1), 182 So. 3d 749, 755, 759, 760, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2015) (Salter, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. B.R.C.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families
(B.R.C.M. II), 215 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2017).
292 See In re E.G.S.-H., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 693b.
293 "Only the written, majority opinion of an appellate court has precedential value" binding
on Florida trial courts. Miller v. Florida, 980 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Gould v. Florida, 974 So. 2d 441, 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
294 See B.R.C.M I, 182 So. 3d at 755, 763 (Salter, J., dissenting); Cleek, Florida Judges,
supra note 12.
295 This routinized process of mass denials rather than individual hearings and individually
crafted judicial orders rendered in each individual child's case brought to mind Walter
Benjamin's THE WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION (Prism Key Press
ed. 2010).
296 See B.R.C.M I, 182 So. 3d at 755, 763 (Salter, J., dissenting); DUE PROCESS IN
IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS E-13 (2019), https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/immig
ration/immig-west/E.pdf (noting that aliens are entitled to due process before neutral fact-
finders rather than partisan adjudicators); Cleek, supra note 12.
297 See B.R.C.M. I, 182 So. 3d at 760 (Salter, J., dissenting). There were some exceptions to
this lack of interest. At least one circuit judge remained receptive to conducting evidentiary
hearings over private petitions, as did a General Magistrate who devoted (and continues to
devote) several days each month in her docket to conducting judicial review hearings for
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In the 2015 case of 17-year-old Honduran child K.B.L.V., the child
sought dependency based on abandonment by only the father.298 The
father consented to the petition, and DCF did not oppose it.299
"Following a seven-minute colloquy with the [child's pro bono]
counsel, the [judge] dismissed the petition on the grounds detailed in
In re E.G.S.-H." 300 The judge asked no questions of the child, the
father, or any other party, including DCF. 301 "The trial court did not
hear evidence, enter findings regarding each parent, or indicate that
the dismissal was without prejudice." 302 The dismissal was affirmed
later by the Third District Court of Appeal, with a special concurring
opinion by Judge Shepherd that echoed and amplified many of Judge
Hanzman's points in In re E.G.S.-H.303
I attended the oral argument in this case and a companion case, In
re B.Y G.M., in which my students and I had submitted an amicus
brief on behalf of several organizations urging reversal. 304 Judge
Shepherd and the other panel members intensely questioned the pro
bono lawyers for the children, from two prominent law firms. 305 The
lawyers struggled to get in a word edgewise as they were barraged
with questions. 306 One of these lawyers had ceded a few minutes of
his time to me, but the judge who asked him the most questions
forced the lawyer to exceed his allotted time, and I was told to sit
down without getting a chance to say one word. 307 We were not
dependent children with USCIS applications pending, pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 39.5075(6)
(2019). But once the binding adverse case law began to roll out of the Third District Court of
Appeals, see, for example, In re B.Y.G.M., 176 So. 3d 290, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) and In
re K.B.L.V., 176 So. 3d 297, 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), the judges' hands were tied, and
virtually no petitions were granted or even heard. See, e.g., In re F.J.G.M, 196 So. 3d 534, 539,
540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (citing In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d 897, 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2016); In re KB.L.V., 176 So. 3d at 299).
298 See In re K.B.L. V., 176 So. 3d at 298.
299 See id. at 298, 299.
300 B.R.C.M. I, 182 So. 3d at 760 (Salter, J., dissenting).
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 In re KB.L.V., 176 So. 3d at 300; id. at 300, 301 (Shepherd, J., specially concurring)
(citing In re B. Y.G.M., 176 So. 3d 290).
304 See Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by Americans for Immigrant Justice, et al. in Support
of Appellant at i, In re B.Y.G.M., 176 So. 3d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (No. 3D14-2409).
305 See Oral Argument at 00:15-16:00, In re B.Y.G.M., 176 So. 3d 290 (No. 3D14-2409),
http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/ArchivedVideo.shtml.
3 See id.
307 See id. at 00:15, 00:15-16:00, 16:14. The video archives of oral arguments in In re
KB.L.V (Case No. 3D14-2746) and In re B.YG.M. (Case No. 3D14-2409) can be accessed on
the Third DCA website, http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/ArchivedVideo.shtml. Video of the
argument in In Re B.R.C.M, heard two years later by a different panel (which did include one
judge from the earlier cases: Judge Shepherd), can be viewed at: https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v-L49TwNT88aM.
Albany Law Review
surprised to get two very strongly worded opinions on the same day
several months later, with Shepherd's even more opinionated special
concurrences, affirming the trial court dismissals.
Similarly, as described above, in the brief trial court phase of
B.R.C.M., "[t]he transcript of the only hearing in the trial court
regarding the petition indicates that the colloquy between court and
counsel lasted eight minutes. No evidence was presented, and no
fact-finding resulted." 308 The judge "did not inquire as to whether
[the child's] parents were served notice or if a diligent search was
required and B.R.C.M.'s counsel was not given an opportunity to
provide any diligent search affidavit regarding his mother's
whereabouts." 309 The judge asked the lawyer three questions: how
was this case distinguishable from E.G.S.-H.?; "[w]hen did [B.R.C.M.]
arrive in Miami?"; and "who [wa]s he living with now?"3 10 At the close
of the colloquy, the judge announced to the child's counsel:
I'm going to deny the petition based on [E.G.S.-H]. And I
assume someone's appealing this and we're waiting to hear
what the answer is; am I correct? Someone must be appealing
this. . . . So my position is that this is still the law of this
Circuit until it's reversed. . . . I'm going to deny the petition.
I'm waiting to see what the appellate court does.311
The trial court issued a three-sentence, one-page order denying the
child's petition. The first two sentences identified the date of the
arraignment hearing and the names of the parties that were in
attendance. The last sentence of the order stated "[lthe petition for
dependency is DENIED based on [E.G.S.-H.], case, by J. Hanzman,
Case No: 14-16379."312 The E.G.S.-Horder, "written by aH trial court
judge in the same circuit court[,] ha[d] no binding or precedential
effect."313 "No finding[] of fact or express rationale was provided by
the trial court in support of its denial of the [p]etition." 314
As the doors to the dependency closed, advocates began to explore
308 In re B.R.C.M. (B.R.C.M. 1), 182 So. 3d 749, 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Salter, J.,
dissenting).
309 Initial Brief of Appellant at 6, B.R.C.M 1, 182 So. 3d 749 (No. 3DI5-962).
310 Trial Court Hearing Transcript at 5:14-15, 7:15-18, B.R. C.M I, 182 So. 3d 749 (No. D15-
015232).
31 Id. at 7:21-24, 8:7-8, 9:13-14.
312 Order Denying Private Petition for Dependency, B.R.C.M. I, 182 So. 3d 749 (No. D15-
15232 D002) (emphasis added).
313 Initial Brief of Appellant, supra note 309, at 7 n.6.
314 Id. at 7.
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other judicial forums and other forms of relief, such as petitions for
temporary custody by extended family under chapter 751 or petitions
for guardianship of a minor under chapter 744.315 Summary denials
of the children's dependency petitions sometimes came with
suggestions tendered by the court to pursue the same allegations in
another division of the circuit court, for example, probate, which
hears guardianship cases. 316  It seemed absurd that the very
allegations of abuse or neglect brought by an immigrant child could
be barred by "case law" in dependency court, but allowed in another
artificial administrative division of the same circuit. Several cases
landed in the family court, which prompted some judges to follow the
bad examples of the dependency judges.3 17 A few summarily denied
petitions by family members without conducting hearings, parroting
in very simplistic terms the nuanced phrases and ideas in Hanzman's
rulings.318 One family court judge even refused to schedule the
hearing in one of these cases, based on her blunt and unfounded
accusation, expressed to the family member's pro bono counsel, that
the case was "all about immigration."319
The migration of these cases from one branch of the court to
another, with different results from different judges or branches of
the same trial court, illustrates a common problem when judges do
not have a clear understanding of their authority to make SIJS best
interest findings and responses vary inconsistently from judge to
315 See FLA. STAT. §§ 751.01(3), 744.3021(1) (2019).
316 See, e.g., W.B.A.V. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 229 So. 3d 850, 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016) (Salter, J., dissenting) ("The trial court ultimately concluded that 'you can go to
probate court and get a legal custodian issued for the aunt or uncle,' and that an adjudication
of dependency would be denied 'based on case law."').
so See, e.g., In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d 897, 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
318 See B.R.C.M. 1, 182 So. 3d at 762, 763 (Salter, J., dissenting).
a19 In this case, a pro bono attorney from a prominent Miami law firm, recruited by
Americans for Immigrant Justice, filed a chapter 751 temporary legal custody by extended
family member petition on behalf of the adult sister of a Haitian child, shortly before the child's
18th birthday. The child's parents had abandoned her at a young age. The child had medical
problems from injuries suffered in the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and her sister needed legal
custody to consent to treatment and claim her as a dependent for insurance coverage. Moments
before the hearing, the judge called the lawyer telling him, ex parte, that she was "knew" that
this case was "all about immigration" and the best interest findings would not be issued. The
judge then advised the attorney that the hearing would be postponed.
After considering his options, the lawyer asked the judge to recuse herself, she agreed, and
the case was reassigned to another family court judge, who granted the petition before the child
turned 18. The lawyer decided not to pursue judicial sanctions against the first judge. The
child's SIJS petition and lawful permanent residence application are currently pending with
USCIS. Telephone interview with pro bono lawyer (Jan. 9, 2019) (attorney's name withheld to
protect identities of client and child); Email from Jennifer Anzardo Valdes, Ams. for Immigrant
Justice (Jan. 23, 2018).
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judge. 320 Clinical Professor Randi Mandelbaum and practitioner
Elissa Steglich characterize this lack of understanding and
inconsistency, resulting in "disparate outcomes" in the cases decided,
as the "quagmire of family court." 3 2 1 They urge legislative action to
clarify state court authority so that judges more clearly understand
their roles and responsibilities in family court SIJS cases, among
other good suggestions. 322 But a well-intentioned legislative fix to a
system rife with adverse or inconsistent rulings on immigrant
children's petitions may not be a strong enough remedy. This is
particularly true when an undercurrent of fear of an influx of SIJS-
dependency cases stokes reactions among judges, resulting in
summary dismissals and a pattern of systematic denials of petitions.
A statutory guarantee of equal treatment may not provide
adequate redress for patterns of judicial discrimination that treat
immigrant children's dependency petitions differently than those
brought on behalf of citizen children, with unequal results based on
the child's alien or immigration status.323 Grounding arguments in a
state constitutional guarantee of equal access to the court may
provide more robust protection for the immigrant child seeking an
adjudication of dependency from the court. 324
320 See, e.g., Theo S. Liebmann, Keeping Promises to Immigrant Youth, 29 PACE L. REV. 511,
512 (2009) ("Some judges have been very open to applying the law to youths in guardianship
cases, while others have refused outright.").
321 See, e.g., Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 227, at 606, 608.
322 See id. at 614.
323 Compare FLA. STAT. § 39.5075(2) (2019) ("Services to children alleged to have been
abused, neglected, or abandoned must be provided without regard to the citizenship of the child
except where alienage or immigration status is explicitly set forth as a statutory condition of
coverage or eligibility.") (emphasis added), with B.R.C.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families
(B.R.C.M. II), 215 So. 3d 1219, 1227 (Fla. 2017) (Canady, J., dissenting) ("Further, it is by no
means clear that section 39.5075-which in subsection (4) authorizes Florida courts to issue
orders 'finding that [a dependent] child meets the criteria for special immigrant juvenile status'
under federal law-applies to private petitions seeking such a finding. Section 39.5075(4)
refers specifically to petitions submitted by 'the department or community-based care provider'
as distinct from private petitions.").
The above-described exercise in statutory obfuscation, completely disregarding the directives
of both section 39.5075(2) and 39.501(1) of the Florida Statutes (indicating that DCF or "any
other person who has knowledge of the facts" may initiate a dependency petition), as a pretext
for giving DCF dependent petitions preferential treatment over private dependent petitions, is
an illustration why a state law alone may not fix systemic discrimination against immigrant
children in violation of the statute's equal treatment guarantee.
324 The Florida Constitution explicitly guarantees a right of access to the courts "to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
FLA. CONST. art I, § 21 (emphasis added). This constitutional right applies to everyone under
the jurisdiction of Florida courts - including alien children seeking access to dependency court
for protection from abandonment, abuse or neglect by parents and caregivers. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. §§ 39.301(1), 39.407(1), 39.4085.
A constitutional claim for equal protection from the court may be more tenuous. See generally
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VII. CLINICS FIGHTING BACK: LITIGATION, EDUCATION, MEDIA
OUTREACH, AND CLIENT STORYTELLING
Judge Shepherd's language shocked immigration lawyers.
Angelina Castro, an immigration lawyer in Stuart, Florida
who has been working on these types of cases for almost two
decades, said she started to notice judges using pronouns like
'these' and 'those' in their rulings, which seemed to make a
distinction between US kids and foreign kids.
_Ashley Cleek, Investigative Reporter325
Throughout this Article, I have charted the evolution of legal
doctrine in the Florida case law affecting immigrant children in
dependency-SIJS cases. In this final part, I continue the discussion
of the role of clinics in representing these clients that I began in Part
III, giving examples of our clinic's roles in different court cases, and
examples of how we affected change through teaching law students,
judges, lawyers, and policymakers, collaborating with other
advocates, reaching out to the media, and telling clients' stories to
courts. This descriptive account is offered as a way to discuss what
needs to be done to sustain the force and effect of the B.R.C.M. II
decision. The multifaceted tasks ahead are grounded in a law school
clinic's commitment to be a "provocateur for justice."326
Ann Lacquer Estin, Child Migrants and Child Welfare: Toward a Best Interests Approach, 17
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 589, 592 (2018) (viewing Plyler v. Doe's equal protection
reasoning for undocumented children's public education rights as a "unique situation" not yet
extended to other child welfare-related contexts). But see Rebecca A. Delfino, The Equal
Protection Doctrine in the Age of Trump: The Example of Undocumented Immigrant Children,
84 BROOK. L. REV. 73, 99-112 (2018)("SIJS' bifurcated, state-federal power-sharing framework,
as well as the language of SIJS,[which] have given the states too much space to interpret the
SIJS law and to create legal standards based on state interpretations of federal law, ultimately
leading to the unequal application of federal law.").
325 Cleek, Florida Judges, supra note 12.
326 See Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 287, 288 (2001).
Professor Aiken's description of clinical legal education's role in instilling in students "an
abiding desire to use their legal skills to remedy these injustices and the wisdom to know the
limitations of the legal system in effectuating comprehensive change .. .[,]" is a lesson that I
have tried to inculcate in my students as they have engaged in the advocacy that I describe in
this Article:
Clinical legal education offers students direct experience as lawyers working for social
justice. Students learn about justice through the practice of poverty law; they bring justice
to under-served communities by meeting essential legal needs; they affect systemic justice
through strategic use of civil rights actions. In short, students play significant roles in
delivering justice.
Id. at 287, 289.
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There remains a continuing need to educate judges about evolving
legal standards. This is particularly necessary because the politics
and rhetoric surrounding immigrants today, the churn of judges in
and out of juvenile dependency court, their limited awareness of
developing case law, and a dearth of institutional memory to guide
them,327 could lead to incorrect legal rulings tainted by partisan anti-
immigrant views. Thus, the post-B.R.C.M. II regime requires
continued monitoring and education by our clinic and others.
A. Litigation
Although B.R. C.M. II established due process rights under chapter
39, the decision did not address how to resolve the handling of abuse
or neglect allegations initiated in other types of custody proceedings.
Thus, temporary custody, guardianship, dissolution, delinquency,
child support, or paternity actions could be susceptible to similar
reactions by judges assigned to other administrative branches of the
circuit court, inasmuch as federal law permits best interest orders to
be issued by any of these courts.328
Our clinic represented a client in an appeal of a summary dismissal
issued, without a hearing, by a family court judge on a petition for
custody by extended family member. 329 This Guatemalan child
experienced severe parental abuse in his home country for many
years.330 His adult brother filed the petition in the Miami-Dade
family court, represented by the FIU clinic. 331
Without a hearing, the judge issued a three-sentence order of
dismissal with prejudice stating:
1. That almost identical allegations of abuse by the minor
child's parents in the home country (Guatemala) have
been seen previously in other similar Petitions.
2. That in each, the terribly abusive offenders have
somehow been convinced to sign consents basically
admitting to these terrible acts ....
3. That there are certain immigration benefits to these
327 See Edwards, supra note 274, at 36, 37; David B. Thronson, OfBorders and Best Interests:
Examining the Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. Hisp.
J.L. & PoL'Y 45, 64 (2005).
328 See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a), (c)(6) (2019).
129 Mendez v. Lopez, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
330 See id.
331 See id.
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Petitions being granted in circumvention of existing
immigration laws. 332
This sweeping dismissal, none of it based on evidence and all of it
based on vague generalities and risible allusions to unidentified
"other similar Petitions,"333 may have been influenced by Judge
Hanzman, but it was little more than a parody of Hanzman's rulings.
It also flouted B.R. C.M. II. The Supreme Court's B.R. C.M. II analysis
of chapter 39 is equally applicable to chapter 751 proceedings.
Nothing in chapter 751 permits a trial court to consider immigration
consequences as a basis to deny a petition for relative custody. 334
Instead, the statute's focus is on promoting the safety and best
interests of children through relative custody.335 Fortunately the
appellate court agreed with these arguments and reversed the trial
court's summary dismissal of the custody petition.336 The reversal,
however, occurred eleven months after the appeal was fully briefed
and two weeks after the child turned 18.337 Winning the appeal on
the merits just past the child's age of majority may have undermined
the trial court's ability to render a child custody order, making this a
pyrrhic victory. This litigation, handled in the trial phase by the FIU
clinic and at the appeal by our clinic, is an example of the work that
law schools do in SIJS cases. The available resources of the pro bono
bar and legal aid organizations are limited.338 Law school clinics add
to the small cadre of lawyers handling this work. 3 3 9
3 Id.; Order of Dismissal with Prejudice at 1, Mendez v. Lopez, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D387 (No.
2017-7005).
33 Mendez, 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D387.
3 See FLA. STAT. § 751.01 (2019).
335 See § 751.01(1).
336 See Mendez, 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D387.
337 See id.; Original Record on Appeal at 9, Mendez, 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D387 (No. 3D17-
1742); Appellant's Initial Brief at 15, Mendez, 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D387 (No. 3D17-1742).
33 See, e.g., Jan Pudlow, Florida Lawyers Stand with Unaccompanied Minors: CABA, One
Campaign Organize Effort to Represent Kids in Immigration and Dependency Courts, FLA. BAR
(Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/florida-lawyers-stand-with-
unaccompanied-minors/ ('"Regardless of your politics on immigration, I am sure everyone would
agree these children should be afforded due process. The judges are very happy to have the
organizations there,' said Lesley Mendoza, executive director of [the Cuban American
Association's] Pro Bono Project, adding that Americans for Immigrant Justice and Catholic
Legal Services have stepped up to help.").
939 A recent thread in the law clinic listserv elicited a flurry of positive reactions to the
announcement of a hard-fought win in a Queens, New York family court SIJS case for two El
Salvadoran siblings by the St. Johns Law School Child Advocacy Clinic. The announcement
observed: "Once routine, uncontested affairs, these hearings have morphed in recent years into
hotly contested battles with an increasingly skeptical and reluctant family court bench."
Posting of Ann L. Goldweber, Dir. of Clinical Educ., lawclinic-bounces@lists.washlaw.edu, to
lawclinic@lists.washlaw.edu (July 5, 2017, 11:00 AM) (on file with author).
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B. Educating Students, Lawyers, Judges and Legislators
Beyond the advocacy performed by clinics is its educational value
to law students of representing these clients. After filing our clinic's
first case for "Tyson" twenty-three years ago, students appeared at
multiple hearings before the dependency judge, who would not accept
the diligent search affidavits that they had prepared to substitute for
personal service on our client's missing parents, due to her concern
that did not satisfy the statutory requirements for proof of diligent
search and constructive service. I recall the interns' impatience with
the judge's demands, which were entirely consistent with the
requirements of Florida dependency law. 3 4 0 There are no better
lessons in civil procedure for law students than courtroom
experiences like these.
Our students also explored the ethical dimensions of judicial
conduct and misconduct. The students who helped me draft the
Judge Colton letter discussed the possibility of pursuing judicial
sanctions. The experience opened my students' eyes to frailties and
imperfections of judges, even well-intentioned judges, not usually
part of the law school curriculum. 341  Observing and studying
instances-in real time-of judicial hostility and judicial "anger"
The hearing was litigated by students in the St. John's clinic, not far from a Long Island
community beset by violent Central American gang activity. This predisposed the judge to view
the siblings as gang members and to disregard the evidence of their victimization by gangs.
Fortunately, the vigorous advocacy performed by the clinic students persuaded the court to
believe the children's testimony "despite the Court's vigorous efforts to discredit, in dozens of
ways large and small, each of the witnesses." Id. After the clients "recounted their
experiences . . . the Court ultimately sided with them, granting them the orders they needed to
proceed with their immigration applications." Id.
Professor Susan Bryant, a clinical faculty member at CUNY Law School, added this gloss to
the thread:
One thing this story makes me think of is all of the children who do not have the benefit
of the excellent advocacy of the St. John's clinic. The bias and skepticism of the judge that
required this high level of advocacy means that all of the children who do not have access
to this level of advocacy are doomed.
Posting of Susan Bryant, lawclinic-bounces@lists.washlaw.edu, to lawclinic@lists.washlaw.edu
(July 5, 2017, 12:17 PM) (on file with author).
340 See FLA. STAT. § 39.502(10); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.225(b).
341 See Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 918 (1933).
Clinic students experience the "human side of the administration of justice" and are exposed to
judges with all of their strengths and fallibilities, thereby gaining a realistic outlook on how
cases are decided by courts, going far beyond the exposition of appellate opinions excerpted in
casebooks, including "[t]he effects of fatigue, alertness, political pull, graft, laziness,
conscientiousness, patience, impatience, prejudice, and open-mindedness of judges." Id.
Frank's early observation, imbued in the legal realism prevalent in the 1930s, is particularly
prescient and apropos to what our students saw in judges in dependency-SIJS cases.
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exposed them to fallibilities of judges and gave them a real-world
outlook on how to frame remedies above and beyond arguments made
in court for an individual client. 342
Indeed, a clinic should be a place where faculty and students
critically examine the role of courts in the lives of their impoverished
and marginalized clients and the power that courts and
administrative agencies exert over them. 3 4 3  Their courtroom
advocacy for immigrant children gave students many opportunities
to reflect on the ethical dimensions, 344 the administration of justice,
and lapses in dispensing justice in the juvenile courts. 345
In our years of doing SIJS advocacy for individual clients, we
shared our expertise and knowledge with judges, lawyers, and policy
stakeholders. We published a guidebook on SIJS, which was used
widely as a resource by judges, lawyers and immigrant children's
advocates throughout the state. 346 We conducted many Continuing
Legal Education trainings on dependency, family and guardianship
law and their intersections with immigration law in the SIJS context.
We spoke at conferences sponsored by the National Association of
Counsel for Children and the National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges.
Leading up to B.R.C.M. II, we held strategy sessions, roundtables,
conference calls, meetings, and workshops on our campus. We
communicated frequently via email exchanges about troubling new
developments in the trial and appellate courts and irksome judges.
342 Students contemplating bringing ethics or disciplinary remedies against a judge would
also be governed by their duty to show respect to the court. See RULES REGULATING THE FLA.
BAR pmbl., ch. 4 (FLA. BAR 2019) ("A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system
and for those who serve it, including judges, lawyers, and public officials. While it is a lawyer's
duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to
uphold legal process.").
343 See Steven Keith Berenson, Preparing Clinical Law Students for Advocacy in Poor
People's Courts, 43 N.M. L. REV. 363, 365 (2013); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical
Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1990).
344 See Amy D. Ronner, Some In-House Appellate Litigation Clinic's Lessons in Professional
Responsibility: Musical Stories of Candor and the Sandbag, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 859, 874 (1996)
("A clinic lends itself to the training of professional responsibility because it is elastic: it brings
all kinds of experiences to the students that inevitably force them to explore their own
judgments and values, the very ones that percolate within the decisions they do and must make
as lawyers.").
345 See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice:
Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 564 (1998)
(questioning fairness and accuracy of fact-finding in juvenile court bench trials).
346 WENDI J. ADELSON, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS IN FLORIDA: A GUIDE FOR
JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND CHILD ADVOCATES 2 (2007), https://media.law.miami.edulclinics/childr
en-and-youth/pdf/2007/special-immigrant-juvenile-manual-200 7 .pdf.
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We trained Florida immigrant advocates on how to obtain best
interest orders in temporary legal custody (chapter 751), paternity
(chapter 742), adoption (chapter 63), and guardianship (chapter 744)
actions. One of the first roundtables held on our campus in November
2016, with over four dozen advocates from around the state, gave
updates on case law and efforts to reverse it in the Florida Supreme
Court. We developed an agenda along various fronts to continue
advocacy in the courts, before DCF and USCIS, and expand outreach
and training to judges and lawyers. The "action items" included:
1. Participating in anticipated DCF rulemaking to update the
latest version of the Alien Child Rule; 3 4 7
2. Updating our clinic's 2007 SIJS bench book;
3. Inviting USCIS policy specialists to train Florida
dependency judges about the specific requirements of the
SIJS statute and the federal government's reliance on the
state court for issuing the best interest order;
4. Reaching out to the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar,
the Florida Bar Legal Needs of Children Committee, and
the Inns of Court, to build broader support from the bar for
our multi-pronged court advocacy and training;
5. Developing strategies and best practices for seeking best
interest orders from the probate court; and continuing
advocacy against the barriers or resistance from some
family court judges refusing to issue "temporary custody"
orders sought by family members of immigrant children;
and
6. Drafting responses to USCIS questions regarding the
validity of best interest orders issued by family court
judges. 348
Not all of these action steps were completed, but they did provide
us with cohesion and unity around a common cause, reminiscent of
similar coordinated advocacy and educational efforts, on a smaller
scale, in the Judge Colton controversy years earlier. We maintained
lines of communication not just inside our loose coalition, but
communicated with USCIS and ORR staff and policy specialists
about issues concerning individual clients in the federal detention
4 See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1OM-47.001, 1OM-47.002, 1OM-47.003 (1995) (recodified as
65C-9.001 (repealed 2015), 65C-9.002, 65C-9.003).
U See E-mail from Rebecca Sharpless, Dir., Immigration Clinic, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law,
to Roundtable Participants (Nov. 30, 2016, 1:29 PM) (on file with author).
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and foster care systems whose access to the state courts had been
thwarted by bad case law and judicial recalcitrance.
We also tried to reach out to the court and met with one of the
newer dependency judges to discuss the growing tensions between
children's advocates and the other judges. The judge expressed
sympathy for our concerns, but also channeled views of his colleagues
that they were being "overwhelmed" by private petitions filed by
Central American children. He suggested we ask the Chief Judge of
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Miami-Dade) to create a "specialized
immigrant children's court." By this point, Third District Court of
Appeal case law barred immigrant petitions from being heard by the
dependency courts if determined to be "motivated" to seek SIJS.3 4 9
We also had concerns about administrative costs of a circuit rule or
order establishing such a specialized court. Moreover, the benefits of
this court (e.g., greater specialization resulting in quicker, more
consistent and accurate adjudications) could carry detriments (e.g.,
large caseloads and no demonstrable improvement in consistency or
accuracy).350
As appeals began to be heard, we hosted moot court sessions to
prepare other lawyers for oral argument. 351 The Miami Law clinics
filed three briefs in the Florida Supreme Court, two in B.R.C.M. II
and one in O.L C.L. I. Our clinic filed two amicus briefs in other trial
and appellate cases described in this Article.352 Most judges were
receptive to the perspectives of the amici.3 5 3 We collaborated with
pro bono lawyers, including several retired appellate judges from
3 See, e.g., In re B.Y.G.M., 176 So. 3d 290, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
35 See, e.g., Michael Morley, The Case Against a Specialized Court for Federal Benefits
Appeals, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 379, 383 (2008) ("[Dlespite the potential benefits of specialization,
empirical evidence strongly suggests that specialized courts do not adjudicate cases more
quickly or accurately than generalist judges.").
s51 This "SIJS coalition" consisted of some extraordinarily talented and dedicated children's
advocates, among them: Jennifer Anzardo Valdes (Americans for Immigrant Justice); Angelina
Castro (private immigration practitioner); Professor Mary Gundrum (FIU clinic); Maryam
Kassaee (Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County); Kristie-Ann Padron (Catholic Charities
Legal Services); Whitney Untiedt (Pro Bono partner at Akerman LLP); and Angela Vigil (Pro
Bono partner at Baker McKenzie).
352 See In re B. YG.M., 176 So. 3d at 290; In re M.A.S-Q. & Y.E.S-Q., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp.
213a (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2013).
353 One notable exception was this ad hominem swipe at our clinic's amicus brief by the
author of the special concurrence in the first appeal decided by the Third District Court of
Appeal: "The term 'amicus curiae' means friend of the court, not friend of a party. Although we
are beyond original meaning now . .. attorneys who file amicus briefs in this court labor under
the same code of conduct as all other counsel who appear here, including the obligation to make
the court aware of precedent that may be contrary to their interest. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar
4-3.3." In re B.Y G.M., 176 So. 3d at 295 n.7 (Shepherd, J., concurring) (citing Ryan v. CFTC,
125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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around the state, who helped us craft stronger arguments and
advised us on how to respond to occasional unpleasant interactions
with some judges.
The American Bar Association got wind of these developments and
invited us to update its Working Group on Unaccompanied Minor
Immigrants at a Roundtable Discussion held at the organization's
annual meeting in Miami in early 2017. The working group, together
with a cross-section of various ABA entities and other groups,
ultimately drafted a resolution for the House of Delegates
recommending the provision of counsel for children at government
expense in immigration proceedings, child-friendly hearings in
immigration court, and better coordination between immigration
court and immigration agencies and state courts hearing SIJS-
related petitions.354 The Resolution called for state court judges and
staff to "receive training to learn to effectively and timely hear and
adjudicate petitions or motions on behalf of immigrant children,
including for the purpose of making the predicate findings that are
required for a child to obtain Special Immigrant Juvenile Status[,]"355
supported by extensive findings in the accompanying Report which
detailed needed improvements in state court SIJS cases. 356
Our clinic already had a track record of SIJS-related advocacy in
the years prior to B.R.C.M. II. We had filed amicus briefs,
administrative appeals, and civil rights litigation in other
jurisdictions, before other tribunals, and in other SIJS-related
contexts. 357 We helped educate the Florida legislature in the 2005
law that it enacted,358 obligating DCF to identify whether children
354 See Immigrant Child Advocacy Network, AM. B. ASs'N, https://www.americanbar.org/gro
ups/probono-public service/projects awards/unaccompanied minors/ (last visited May 3,
2019).
355 See Am. Bar Ass'n, Policy Resolution 115 Adopted by the House of Delegates (Feb. 9,
2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/childlaw/resources/attorneys/fair-treatment-and-
access-to-justice-for-immigrant-children/.
356 See Annie Chen, An Urgent Need: Unaccompanied Children and Access to Counsel in
Immigration Proceedings, AM. B. AsS'N (July 14, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/litigation/committees/childrens-rights/articles/2014/urgent-need-unaccompanied-children-
access-to-counsel-immigration-proceedings/ ("[TIhe appropriate jurisdictional grounds for filing
in state court are varied and depend on the individual state.... [T]he complexity of navigating
these pro se is [virtually impossible] for an immigrant child. Even if a child knows that he is
eligible for SIJS, questions abound-which court should he file in, and what kind of proceeding
is most appropriate to bring? Should the child start the claim, or the adult caring for the
child?").
357 See, e.g., Joubert v. Barnhart, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2005); Occean v. Kearney,
123 F. Supp. 2d 618 (S.D. Fla. 2000); In re Juvenile 2002-098, 813 A.2d 1197 (N.H. 2002); Brief
of Amici Curiae on Behalf of Respondents at 1, In re C.S.-L., No. A77-825-989 (BIA 2008)
(unpublished decision).
358 See FLA. STAT. § 39.5075 (2019) ("Citizenship or residency status for immigrant children
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who have been adjudicated dependent are U.S. citizens, and if not, to
evaluate whether they are eligible for SIJS and to provide a statutory
mechanism for the children to obtain this immigration relief. 35 9
Clinic faculty provided education to practitioners and scholars
through some of our published scholarship on SIJS law and policy. 360
I cite these examples of diverse forms of clinical education as
suggestions about how the law school clinical community can
combine its advocacy activity for these clients with the education of
students, judges, lawyers, and policy stakeholders.
C. Outreach to the Media
The cold reception that immigrant children's dependency petitions
received from Florida judges began to attract attention from the
media. 361 One report focused on Judge Shepherd in particular,
who are dependents."); see also Laura K. Abel, Keeping Families Together, Saving Money, and
Other Motivations Behind New Civil Right to Counsel Laws, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1087, 1097-
98, 1099 n.72 (2009) (describing the enactment of counsel for children in Florida and the efforts
of several individuals).
359 Act of June 17, 2005, 2005 Fla. Laws ch. 2005-263. The Senate Staff Analysis and
Economic Impact Statement highlighted several key benefits of the proposed legislation:
Benefits to children who are granted permanent residency include the rights to live and
work permanently in the United States, to travel in and out of the country and, after five
years, to apply for U.S. citizenship. In addition, Florida may be eligible for federal funds
to support foster care for children who are permanent residents, while they cannot receive
funds for them while they are undocumented.
CHILDREN & FAMILIES COMM., SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT: SB
498: IMMIGRANT CHILDREN/RESIDENCY STATUS 3 (2005). The number of new cases that the
legislation would generate was estimated to be minimal (One outside estimate: "25 children
per year will be eligible to apply for SIJS through the provisions of this bill." Id. at 5. DCF was
"unable to estimate the number of children likely to be served but characterized the number as
a 'small population."' Id.).
soo See, e.g., Wendi J. Adelson, The Case of the Eroding Special Immigrant Juvenile Status,
18 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 65, 70, 70 n.23 (2008); Meghan Johnson & Kele Stewart, Unequal
Access to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: State Court Adjudication of One-Parent Cases,
AM. B. ASS'N (July 14, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/con
tent/articles/summer20 14-07 14-unequal-access-special-immigrant-juvenile-status-state-court-
adjudication-one-parent-cases.html.
361 Some local news coverage leaned in favor of the judges. The Miami Herald's venerable
child welfare reporter portrayed some children less as victims of abuse than as abusers of the
dependency court process to get coveted green cards. See, e.g., Carol Marbin Miller, One Path
to Green Card: Cite Child Abuse, MIAMI HERALD (July 22, 2015), https://www.miamiherald.com
/ news/local/community/miami-dade/article28368841.html ("[T]he reluctance of child welfare
judges to open 'a Pandora's box' by lifting 'the floodgates' to Central American children fleeing
violence.").
Other South Florida coverage was more sympathetic to the children. See, e.g., Jane
Musgrave, Case of Lake Worth Immigrant Teen Heads to Florida Supreme Court, PALM BEACH
POST (Nov. 7, 2015), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/crime--law/case-lake-worth-
immigrant-teen-heads-florida-supreme-court/bpxf29aiEkGlDdKkTKxuxL/ ("When his mother
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alarmed by his off-the-cuff comments in hearings and the seemingly
partisan political views that he expressed in his opinions and special
concurrences. 3 6 2 The reporter, Ashley Cleek, affiliated with the
Center for Investigative Reporting and Freelance Investigative
Reporters and Editors, broadcast a feature story on this topic on the
NPR program Reveal in October 2017, as part of an hour-long
broadcast on the Trump administration's crackdowns on
immigrants. 363
In her fifteen-minute segment, she examined the surge of
unaccompanied minors escaping violence in Central America whose
cases had been brought to Florida state courts and rebuffed by
judges.364 She interviewed advocates and one retired judge, and
followed one case and observed a children's court hearing. 365 Her
more in-depth analysis of this controversy in the January 22, 2018,
online issue of The Nation, included public records data and details
about several of the cases dismissed by judges.366
Both in the NPR broadcast and The Nation article, Cleek's
coverage portrayed the growing tensions between advocates for
young immigrants in family and juvenile courts, seeing their clients
as absolutely needing court protection due to "obvious example[s] of
parental neglect and abuse,"3 6 7 only to be told no by a growing
segment of the state judiciary, which she saw as punting its
responsibility to care for these children to DHS as part of its plenary
authority over immigration. The radio broadcast captured one child
at the center of the debate: "Caught in the middle are kids like Isaias,
a 17-year-old from Guatemala who fled gang violence in his tiny
hometown." 368
Judge Shepherd, interviewed at his Miami law firm after retiring
kicked him out of her house because she was unable to provide him clean water to drink, much
less food to eat, a 17-year-old Guatemalan youth set out on what became a 5,000-mile journey
in search of a better life.").
362 See, e.g., Cleek, Florida Judges, supra note 12 ("Judge Shepherd's language shocked
immigration lawyers. Angelina Castro, an immigration lawyer in Stuart, Florida who has been
working on these types of cases for almost two decades, said she started to notice judges using
pronouns like 'these' and 'those' in their rulings, which seemed to make a distinction between
US kids and foreign kids.").
363 See Inside Trump's Immigration Crackdown, REVEAL (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www
.revealnews.org/episodes/inside-trumps-immigration-crackdown/ [hereinafter REVEAL,
Immigration Crackdown].
3 See id.
365 See id.
366 See Cleek, Florida Judges, supra note 12.
367 Id.; see also REVEAL, Immigration Crackdown, supra note 363 (discussing examples of
such neglect and abuse).
368 REVEAL, Immigration Crackdown, supra note 363.
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from the bench, maintained his steadfast skepticism and hostility
toward these cases, largely repeating points made in his published
opinions and ad hoc statements from the bench to advocates who
appeared before him in oral arguments. 369 The advocates she
interviewed rebutted his dismissive abstract generalities in
passionate human terms about the children they represented. 370
My clinic colleague Robert Latham assisted the reporter in
procuring and analyzing public records and helping her to use case
studies in the two stories that she produced on the different
challenges facing Florida immigrant children and their lawyers. At
various junctures they collaborated on the fact-finding and shared
findings and results. The clinic-investigative reporting outreach and
collaboration helped to bring to a national audience public attention
to judicial biases against immigrant children and was a valuable
tactic in our clinic's multi-pronged advocacy campaign to educate at
least public radio listeners and liberal magazine readers in the court
of public opinion about this growing problem. 371
D. Telling Clients' Stories
A recurrent motif in court rulings and opinions discussed in this
Article was their sweeping assumptions and stock stories about
Central American children "flooding" the courts. 372 The judges did
not recognize the individual immigrant children appearing before
them and turned their claims of past abuse and maltreatment into
369 See Cleek, Florida Judges, supra note 12 ('"The petitioners were seeking to rely upon
alleged abuse, abandonment, or neglect in one of these countries, and sometimes not even that,'
Shepherd said. 'And whether that's true or not is pretty hard to determine in El Salvador, and
[the Florida Department of Children and Families] is unlikely to seek to make such a
determination. They have enough problems, issues, and truly abused and abandoned children
in this state to take care of."').
370 See, e.g., id. ('I figured-this is a child. She was raped.... She's not in school. She has
no one taking care of her. There's no way that you can say that this child was not neglected or
abused or abandoned,' [immigrant child's attorney Rina] Gil said. Despite acknowledging
Lucia's father's mistreatment, the judge denied her dependency and, with it, her best shot at
protection from abuse and deportation. 'I just don't know what happened that day,' Gil told
me.").
371 This collaboration happened serendipitously, but it helped our advocacy. See Sameer
Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 399 (2008) ("[Mlost
public interest lawyers . . . develop campaigns on parallel tracks, including litigation, policy
and legislative advocacy, community and public education, media advocacy, and international
or transnational advocacy."); see also Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement's
Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1927, 1932
(2007) ("[Tlactical pluralism ... use[s] traditional litigation alongside nontraditional skills
such as drafting legislation and conducting public relations.").
372 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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bureaucratic generalities, labelling them "these cases." When seen
in the context of recent public discourse about immigrants, inflected
with degrading slurs of them as rapists, predators, and MS-13 gang
members, these generalities took on a more sinister tone.3 7 3 Those of
us who know these children, because we interview them, investigate
their cases, learn about their histories and reasons for journeying to
the U.S. and to courthouses in the U.S., knew that even the anodyne
portrayals of them by courts were not telling the whole story.
"These cases" are about individual children each of whom has a
deeply personal reason for seeking safety and protection in the U.S.374
In one of two amicus briefs that I helped to prepare in B.R.C.M. II,
the University of Miami Clinics brief, which my Immigration Clinic
colleague Rebecca Sharpless took the lead in drafting, we delivered
both a lawyerly exposition of pertinent state and federal laws and a
"stories" brief.3 75 The stories of our clients that we shared with the
court (one from each clinic) were intended to illustrate how
dependency courts had appropriately intervened in the lives of
immigrant children in private dependency cases. Telling our clients'
individual stories countered narratives that the children sought only
immigration relief from the court. Each of our illustrative stories
proceeded from the premise that mere "acceptance of jurisdiction over
the custody of a child by a juvenile court ... makes the child
dependent upon the juvenile court, whether the child is placed by the
court in foster care or . . . in a guardianship situation."376 Some
373 See Scott Neuman, During Roundtable, Trump Calls Some Unauthorized Immigrants
Animals', NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 17, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05
/17/611877563/during-roundtable-trump-calls-some-unauthorized-immigrants-animals;
Amber Phillips, 'They're Rapists.' President Trump's Campaign Launch Speech Two Years
Later, Annotated, WASH. POST (June 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix
/wp/201 7/06/16/theyre-rapists-presidents-trump-campaign-launch-speech-two-years-later-
annotated/.
'74 See, e.g., SONIA NAZARIO, ENRIQUE'S JOURNEY (Random House ed. 2014) (following the
path of a boy's migration from Honduras to the United States); UNICEF, BROKEN DREAMS:
CENTRAL AMERICAN CHILDREN'S DANGEROUS JOURNEY TO THE UNITED STATES 2, 4, 5 (2016),
https://www.unicef.org/media/files/UNICEFChildAlertCentralAmerica_2016_report
.final(1).pdf.
3 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 149, at 5, 12. Telling client stories to courts and
other tribunals has long been part of the public interest lawyer's arsenal. Giving voice to the client's
real life-account of experiences in the courtroom or legislative arena strengthens the lawyer's
technical arguments regarding laws and policies that the lawyer seeks to challenge or enforce for
the client. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2109-10 (1991); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and
Stories About Them, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 9, 33 (1994); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to
Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE. L.J. 763, 765-66 (1994); Bernard P.
Perlmutter, "Letting Kids Be Kids" Youth Voice and Activism to Reform Foster Care and Promote
"Normalcy", 72 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 121, 123 (2017).
376 In re Menjivar, 1995 WL 18235939, at *2 (U.S. Dep't of Justice Jan. 3, 1995); see also
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children required a full spectrum of services, while others did not. 3 7 7
When services were not needed, the judicial actions of establishing
guardianships and monitoring the children's life situations and
applications for SIJS status were often required to ensure their well-
being and protection.378
"Maria," a Honduran child represented by the Immigration Clinic,
was sexually assaulted in her hometown, abandoned by her mother,
encouraged by her father to come to the U.S., and then forced by him
to work full-time as an unpaid nanny.379 She was declared dependent
based on a private dependency petition, and her godmother, who had
cared for her after her parents refused to take care of their daughter,
was awarded legal custody by the court. 380  She applied for
immigration status as a special immigrant juvenile and planned to
go to college and study medicine. 381
"Yesenia," a child born in Mexico was abandoned by her father at
birth and neglected by her mother, who gave her to a criminal
smuggling gang that held her for ransom. 382 When the Health Rights
Clinic was contacted by her grandmother, with whom she was living
in Miami, she had not seen her mother since she was nine months
old. 38 3 The grandmother asked for the clinic's assistance since "she
was having difficult[ies] enrolling Yesenia into a pre-kindergarten
program without a custodial order."3 8 4 The clinic filed a private
dependency petition, which was granted by the court.385  The
grandmother was awarded legal custody, enabling her to enroll her
in school, provide medical care, and obtain other support for the
child. 3 8 6 The court continued to monitor the case for a few years, to
ensure that Yesenia's needs were met.3 87 Yesenia applied for SIJS
and was flourishing in elementary school.388
Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir. of Domestic Operations, U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs. & Pearl Chang, Acting Chief of Office of Policy & Strategy,
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. to Field Leadership, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Servs. 2 (Mar. 24, 2009) (on file with author) (explaining changes to law that impacted aliens
seeking orders from juvenile courts appointing guardians).
37 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 149, at 15, 16, 17.
378 See, e.g., id. at 16-17.
37 See id. at 13, 14.
3o See id. at 15.
381 See id.
382 See id. at 15-16.
383 See id. at 16.
384 Id.
385 See id.
86 See id.
387 See id. at 17.
388 See id. at 16-17.
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"Daniel," an orphaned teenager born in the Bahamas, came to the
U.S. on a visa after the death of his mother.389 He lived "with a series
of temporary family and non-family caregivers." 390 Despite the
instability of his living arrangements, he did well in school but had
no one taking care of him, no means of support, and no ability to
attend post-secondary school. 391 The Children & Youth Law Clinic
represented him in a private dependency petition, and the court
placed him in foster care. 3 92 He applied for and received permanent
residence as a special immigrant juvenile, and enrolled in college
before turning 18.393 He was a student leader both in his high school
and college. 394
The stories illustrated the grave impact that permitting B.R.C.M
I to stand would have had on their lives as abused, abandoned and
neglected immigrant children. 395 They also showed why Florida
dependency courts must adjudicate all dependency petitions on a
case-by-case basis, issuing appropriate orders and holding hearings
as the case required, regardless of the child's alien or immigration
status. Lastly, they served as a counter to some of the judges' more
disparaging and misleading narratives about immigrant children's
cases that this Article describes. 396
VIII. CONCLUSION: JUDGES ASKING QUESTIONS-REDUX-IN THE
AGE OF TRUMP
The children will be taken care of-put into foster care or
whatever.
-Trump Chief of Staff John Kelly3 97
389 See id. at 17.
390 Id.
391 See id.
392 See id. at 17-18.
393 See id. at 19.
3 See id. at 18, 19.
395 See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF Soc. POLICY, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS: A
CRITICAL PATHWAY TO SAFETY AND PERMANENCE 1 (2016), https://cssp.org/wp-content/uploads
/ 2018/08/SIJS-Fed-States.pdf ("[T]hese children and youth face unique challenges due to the
trauma they may have experienced in their home country and through their migration. Many
do not have an identified caregiver in the United States who can support their physical and
emotional needs.").
396 Child advocates and children's law scholars also have mined client narratives to lend
greater force to the legal case. See, e.g., Janet A. Chaplan, Youth Perspectives on Lawyers'
Ethics: A Report on Seven Interviews, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1763, 1765 (1996) ("Thus, listening
to the details of the clients' concerns is a better tool for understanding the preferences of
powerless clients than are the classical ethical abstractions. . . . [T]he client's story, rather than
the structure of the lawyer's case, is the primary focus.").
39 Transcript: White House Chief of Staff John Kelly's Interview with NPR, NAT'L PUB.
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After months of horrible news about the caravans of Central
American children arriving with their families at the border, trying
to enter the U.S., and then being separated from their parents by the
Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, put into
cages, confined in large detention centers, not released to sponsors,
and the endless rampant immigrant-bashing by the president and his
team, 398 I was exhausted and spent. I continued to hear reports from
around the state about judges pushing these children out of their
courtrooms. The national story and the state court story seemed to
blend into each other.
But all hope was not lost. I took solace in Judge Salter's B.R. C.M.
I dissent, which was both a scholarly dissection of the troubling
trends in the Florida courts and a testament to his empathy and
compassion for these children, in contrast to the interpretive violence
evident in the lower court majority opinion. 399 I was also grateful for
B.R.C.M. II, even though it did not directly confront the more
troubling undercurrents in the lower court's opinion. Given the
narrow scope of the plurality's opinion and evident fragmentation in
the court, B.R. C.M. II also fell short of New Jersey's Supreme Court's
more fulsome overview of federal and state SIJS law and its detailed
guidance to trial courts, in* H.S.P. v. J.K400 But B.R.C.M. I did
forcefully admonish Florida courts to accord B.R.C.M. and other
children like him a modicum of due process so that, as Judge Salter
observed in his Third District Court of Appeal dissent, "immigrant
children may obtain what other children in Florida routinely obtain
in dependency cases-an investigation and individualized
adjudication of their exigent circumstances." 401
In August 2018 at the annual Circuit Judges conference held at a
resort in Naples, Florida, I had a chance to revise some of my views
and impressions of Florida's dependency and family court judges. I
was invited to speak on a panel, together with Maryam Kassaee, an
attorney in the Palm Beach Legal Aid Immigrant Advocacy Project.
We spoke about how to identify whether a non-citizen child's
RADIO (May 11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/11/610116389/transcript-white-house-
chief-of-staff-john-kellys-interview-with-npr.
18 See US: Border Patrol: Hundreds of Children Kept in Cages at Facility in Texas, ABC
NEWS, https://www.abc.net.aulnews/2018-06-18/us-border-patrol-facility-in-texas-children-in-
cages/9880192 (last updated June 18, 2018).
399 See In re B.R.C.M. (B.R.C.M 1), 182 So. 3d 749, 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Salter, J.,
dissenting); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word., 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1613-14 (1986).
4oo See H.S.P. v. J.K., 121 A.3d 849, 857 (N.J. 2015).
401 B.R.C.M. I., 182 So. 3d at 766 (Salter, J., dissenting).
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immigration status is a factor under chapter 39 (dependency) and
chapter 751 (temporary legal custody); the criteria for SIJS and the
distinct roles of the state courts and federal government in SIJS
adjudications; and how to draft an order that serves the best interests
of the non-citizen child and withstands state and federal scrutiny.
We used some case examples to illustrate these learning goals.
I had some trepidation about doing this presentation, fearing that
a judge might stand on a soap box and rail against immigrant hordes
misusing our courts to get quick green cards. But none of the 60 or
70 judges in the room said anything like this. They mostly asked
smart technical questions about how to fulfill their obligations to
make abuse and neglect findings under state law so that their best
interest orders would meet the legal sufficiency requirements of the
SIJS statute. A few family court judges expressed discomfort about
making abuse or neglect findings in temporary legal custody cases
without the capacity to rely on investigations conducted by DCF that
dependency judges typically utilize. One judge asked if any
legislation had been introduced, as Justice Lawson urged in B.R.C.M.
II.
This exchange gave me renewed faith in our state's judges,
understanding their duty to follow the law, even if they do not
personally agree with what the law requires them to do, even with all
the polarized discourse over immigrants at our border and in our
communities. Only one "political" question was asked. It came from
a Miami-Dade judge sitting in the front row. He asked what would
happen if several hundred children held at one of the largest private
detention facilities in the country, in Homestead at the southern end
of our county, were to be released to sponsors in Miami.402 I sighed
and quoted the president's chief of staff, and told these judges that
they would have to do their jobs and help these kids complete their
journeys to the courthouse.
402 See Miriam Jordan, Trump Administration to Nearly Double Size of Detention Center for
Migrant Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/us
/migrant-children-shelter-tent-city-tornillo-homestead.html?fbclid=IwAR2BSOC9GWOFS5V9
Ea3KHrACnFkZhdGQQxRcGWLJcqlbj7Kqxdgl9tNN3I ("The government plans to expand
the number of children housed at a 'temporary shelter' in Homestead, Fla., from 1,350 to 2,350
in January, according to a Dec. 26 letter from the Department of Health and Human Services
outlining the plan.").
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